Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 74d6e374d7958e70…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

124.3 KB Created: 2020-05-11 15:09:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: 738ff32e2cf3378cac040f21727a6322 SHA-1: 2e8bdfe86d755746f3233e154366269425d70c24 SHA-256: 74d6e374d7958e70c6733b6c17e2f0d79b629e172aaf385c142c76678647f3b8
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains a heavily obfuscated VBA macro with an auto-execute 'Document_Open' subroutine. This macro attempts to construct a file path 'C:\1\Whole\PFSDNSKDF.EXE' and writes hex-encoded data to it. It then uses WMI (Win32_Process) to execute the created file, indicating it acts as a dropper for a second-stage payload. The presence of 'GetObject' and 'CreateObject' calls further supports its malicious intent.

Heuristics 7

  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.HexEncodedEXEHeader-9789587-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.HexEncodedEXEHeader-9789587-1
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
5a9af849fa1f7d1d6c6b9e41b9147875b2d55757f68eac794ce795ae1fc6e31e		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1798 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
57acbd0e4a492dbe26d3e97e49d60dc4b72fdfe379d825f51d68d9268c748722		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 11776 bytes

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