Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 74d199349b9b073f…

MALICIOUS

RTF

77.4 KB First seen: 2019-06-27
MD5: a77fb4c1dd724130fcc64a82f4c34d03 SHA-1: d64eb21930823c8b09b0c55998ef6b47ac680fd9 SHA-256: 74d199349b9b073f57ebae9b0b717a681dae8779ba0e02cb00be046782db40b4
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating exploitation of a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component. The \objupdate directive forces the activation of this OLE object, leading to arbitrary code execution. This is a common technique for delivering malicious payloads.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00007844.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x7844 1799 bytes
SHA-256: 0818c6d684a1f49d33ff18f479161eaa0cd673206b4cabeb9f0c9e71d5a8050c

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