Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 74d115f0441627b9…

MALICIOUS

RTF

77.9 KB First seen: 2023-08-10
MD5: 22a53781e8ed2786f7151db1d50cf9c1 SHA-1: e1f7bfa1c0809a7c9776a9762f4d0ba058c1e595 SHA-256: 74d115f0441627b9372d729dcdbc85bf224aceb165d655109f3b224eaab5668f
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object and specifically triggers ".objupdate", indicating an attempt to activate the object. The presence of the RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR heuristic strongly suggests exploitation of a vulnerability within Microsoft Equation Editor. The document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', which is a common tactic to bypass security measures and execute malicious content.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00002fda.bin
2778ad86db64d86bc01162376c89c2d8a0b8b422ea8b7a6df464944b2337cd4c
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2FDA 1909 bytes