Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 74d0a82fd35171c7…

MALICIOUS

PDF

64.2 KB Created: 2021-02-21 15:52:28 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-22
MD5: 7aa3d86862a081b265dbea78193d4820 SHA-1: 6fdc3f7ce80b3c9be08d69044d1bba5e3594206f SHA-256: 74d0a82fd35171c7b2f9b69022c185f25a2140d69dfd1e7a647a106ba6d57c54
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains multiple embedded URLs pointing to known malicious redirectors and disposable hosting, indicating a phishing or malware distribution attempt. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent. Although no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded links are indicative of an attempt to lure the user to malicious content, likely leveraging JavaScript for execution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://crophysi.ru/aws?utm_term=what+is+the+main+idea+of+all+summer+in+a+day In PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/defisepeniba/ggirjfo/wulubejigorar.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mumizovis.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134350635/paxezafomo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/toromerepowa/e1Pjbif/dirt_bike_racing_game_unblocked.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jomokojexenubi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134877089/jojesebuzakokolasev.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/fasazani/gjahiie/salsa_dance_lessons_for_beginners_near_me.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/fegadosijete/i2jajbQ/23356130349.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://13millions-warzone.store/look_back_in_anger_john_osborne_download0cf36.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://copyrightshelpscenters.com/disneyland_resort_paris_case_study_answers9vtfi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/kanereneb/3jf9Xgc/dufamafikeri.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nadatipaj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135347779/655294.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/pujirageg/gavik.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fukefuxatolu.epizy.com/zefebemejawim.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/ropuba/manager_untuk_uc_browser_android.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000b00c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB00C 5144 bytes
SHA-256: 5f56ddd5d5cbd2792a9d124ef7335d6007c5eae33ea43bf6093fe4b301dfe30d
font_01_sfnt_off0000c16d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC16D 10540 bytes
SHA-256: a7d4a9ccd91e1f193c0b12ef82d082dc15c39bee0211ad990cc0cf1366f26f9f
font_02_sfnt_off0000e58a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE58A 4324 bytes
SHA-256: d1f4a20f0e35a0564be54678b929bb8c711862c507f070c2b9a6abea8daf4378

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.