Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 74a1e104945c54ea…

MALICIOUS

RTF

11.4 KB First seen: 2019-12-09
MD5: 62d783e99d3a2fdf140314c20af0b653 SHA-1: 16c63f914e5d30b7986a05145b4d1139679455ef SHA-256: 74a1e104945c54eacc5c7ed1ac79917dabaab6f9fe3048d98c847d34b64deca8
240 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains critical heuristics indicating the presence of a payload exploiting CVE-2017-11882 via Microsoft Equation Editor. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution when the embedded OLE object is activated. The file is classified as malicious due to this exploit.

Heuristics 6

  • Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 likely critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    RTF decodes to an activated Microsoft Equation 3.0 OLE storage whose payload is a high-entropy Ole10Native stream rather than normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is a weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape consistent with CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802.
  • Ole10Native stream in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM
    RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an Ole10Native stream. This is a strong payload-container signal and is related to Word/OLE exploit delivery, but it is not specific enough on its own to assign a CVE.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000bde.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBDE 4148 bytes
SHA-256: 63ce7e85aa7c8cf7edd6d506cefec2b3e5aa50480dd493dc760d90cb9bc8ab83