Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 749ab1e9ea8b64f6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

107.7 KB Created: 2020-07-10 05:16:23 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-09-04
MD5: 278e7b6195af9bedb89982e6b09d3267 SHA-1: d03a3f46021d48b3f3b1f6906a09e88df967b55d SHA-256: 749ab1e9ea8b64f6aeeb8a1f6ce87f77b34766fa60a371b37989c4e75b5b8347
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many pointing to disposable domains, indicating a link farm or SEO manipulation tactic. One critical heuristic identified a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains a URL that aligns with the observed malicious link farm behavior.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/wb?keyword=bourbaki%20topology%20pdf In PDF document text
    • http://files.basevillageforgifted.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164272/2582109.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.seeingsouthern.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871994/620f0504947.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.evelandfarm.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131436971/93088aafe1eb3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.hbcindy.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856041/sisema-sokeri-rodirupijef-veguxuvagobufi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.romemta.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815175/guzulugizoxupilaruz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.thevisualnarrative.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407086/5196340.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.thefeltfactory.co.nz/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776841/xizixexa-dajawotubep-fekifomidele.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.kevinkilroy.org/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814387/bamomu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://rakelogexexo.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/38594717366.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wexozixa.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/mimadizuwotadu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xidiseso.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/monasowu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://siwelapow.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/6009922680.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/mituvazejuremoposanizama.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/46287179129.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/ziwodukujaluladiludu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000155e8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x155E8 5044 bytes
SHA-256: 70ee0905138482beff804226145f2d35625a06a1516a0150eb1f6582f50f7b8f
font_01_sfnt_off00016730.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x16730 10356 bytes
SHA-256: 2279fcd8a6a93f980c19c141f27c9db70c13f0f57c0ba8546412f5d12bf56c9a
font_02_sfnt_off00018afa.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x18AFA 16376 bytes
SHA-256: 7d14909007edf92020360fef6c45d1f477ac83cd02861a5dbb39b061674b8805

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