Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 748b72a938ef33e6…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

27.7 KB
MD5: cf8c0773511e5c163effbe6a0b6d0331 SHA-1: 678d9691a6c9d5b070b188f60543e872337e814b SHA-256: 748b72a938ef33e6e4744a6966d8c4d17d0e3bc234d7ce080c7f8a355491148f
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains a malicious OLE object that exploits CVE-2017-11882. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution when the object is activated, likely leading to the download and execution of a secondary payload. The presence of the 'equATiON.3' ProgID strongly indicates the use of the Equation Editor exploit.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001b0a.bin
c99c8e3d25c2931a09f0e6bd5be48cdb601e4aa4d2a49088a3bd1467b17563bb		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1B0A 2161 bytes

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