Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7435562edc65ac0a…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

191.7 KB Created: 2020-06-11 22:00:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 15.0000
MD5: cf0adaf72e3562a82d6a9dc51f438907 SHA-1: 907c65ccb50d169f55b3c97a28e37286f32d8807 SHA-256: 7435562edc65ac0a5e54b5edf159cc30128e74ec4befd3cbaa54c01212a256a8
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains a Document_Open macro that executes obfuscated VBA code. This code uses CreateObject to likely launch a secondary payload, as indicated by the 'auto-exec + custom decoder + CreateObject/Shell/exec sink' heuristic. The obfuscated nature of the script and the use of CreateObject suggest a downloader or dropper functionality.

Heuristics 6

  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
1f12c487f76526491710ca1c4f65ba83c3271439c217d0761153ae1753cb1265		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1787 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
2107e980bf5452e49889d940275a0841e4c1b0ced9305af3fa64c3f23e4ceb6b		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 10752 bytes

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