Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 742dfbd68fc6bf98…

MALICIOUS

PDF

51.1 KB Created: 2020-09-10 19:32:17 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 03733da15c6086a8bc68769efab004fe SHA-1: 1ddf44cdcc68afb7ec314625b6bcab2ac8a33075 SHA-256: 742dfbd68fc6bf98dcd2924e1d312474efdc8fba449ac7ef1b8f8e66245243ec
224 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links pointing to various domains, many of which are structured as SEO link farms. One URL, 'https://ttraff.ru/wix?keyword=modelo+relacional+base+de+datos+ejemplos+pdf', is identified as a malicious redirector. The presence of a 'Password-protected archive handoff' heuristic suggests the document may be intended to trick users into downloading a password-protected file, which is a common tactic for evading security scans.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/wix?keyword=modelo+relacional+base+de+datos+ejemplos+pdf
    • http://files.illustrioustees.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380000/dobaxukatolulizuw.pdf
    • http://files.battleofnormandytours.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453453/rirodilaz.pdf
    • http://files.ilaproject.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164198/4058518.pdf
    • http://files.stirchleyartroom.co.uk/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739922/6444618.pdf
    • http://xezav.goodyearpianoservice.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681311/wulixolefowi_pebofupobarepu_wetimako.pdf
    • http://lobogef.menortheast.org/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814328/wajowozapawon.pdf
    • http://majomu.upsidedowndimples.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775607/sakoses_duvoxuwagugitu_dobuzoteb.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_9c96f03232f04614b75e5c3fb64f32f6.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/3d0627_358a28ba630640679813bdd7b67f85dc.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/ac0094_eb3720918a79441d8f6fe450676cf38c.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/0255/2735/files/knockout_foreach_template.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/1146/5631/files/bazosud.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00008622.bin
01080bfa09718fb316d594a59a0142091865b6bc9b0557183c277c1c167194e5		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8622 5520 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000098d8.bin
796b84aac4ae050e32ee0a8f8a936a41bb123cda3ef48f96d7556e3c84427495		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x98D8 11792 bytes

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