Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7412cd1eb93902e7…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

24.1 KB
MD5: 2dc57c58c86a81d98abf7e0c427608f8 SHA-1: 752d4ac6c6ac85ebe70703762968eb92dad8b2ab SHA-256: 7412cd1eb93902e728d942a82b7d0ec17a0cbdaecb96cbee4642a038d247d23e
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, indicating an attempt to exploit this vulnerability for initial execution. The specific exploit used is likely CVE-2017-11882, a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001a45.bin
3856c160d1b0189181aa0ba7a4cb15379ae076fae3245dc10282db09a28286e0
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1A45 1671 bytes