Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7411f0e5e87a5a58…

MALICIOUS

PDF

71.8 KB Created: 2020-07-09 03:16:23 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 361f2c0e9af1fe5fe410b6cb0f3b4dae SHA-1: 0651cd056043c53237932239f8332d15223c1095 SHA-256: 7411f0e5e87a5a58f4958424d706ffc92befa914aa94440e5656c37c9973158a
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF file contains a large number of embedded links, constituting a link farm designed to drive traffic to various websites. One of the URLs, https://ttraff.ru/, is identified as a known malicious redirector. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness, suggesting the primary purpose is to lead users to potentially harmful content or further malicious infrastructure.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/wb?keyword=japji%20sahib%20paath%20english%20translation%20pdf
    • http://files.katlynsampsonphotography.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437832/xilub.pdf
    • http://files.oscarandoliverohbaby.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776640/wekilonid.pdf
    • http://files.santanhistorical.org/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406049/kexikulabidap-rezuvagov-kejevilam-vadubivelesisan.pdf
    • http://files.fillmorebulldogbands.org/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380953/8a635.pdf
    • http://files.wigbate.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871894/fisidakug.pdf
    • http://files.broadwaytattoos.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131409557/mutifajebivoz.pdf
    • http://files.rivermenrodandgunclub.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132302973/nomegariwutok-wibiwu-visinatixubuj-sojimuta.pdf
    • http://files.tarotartist.net/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681938/8280551.pdf
    • http://files.rincon4school.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130970012/482760.pdf
    • http://files.eagletreeproductions.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379868/4884163.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://desarevale.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/sakado.pdf
    • https://jerobure.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/60299508386.pdf
    • https://kowekoti.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/41893442789.pdf
    • https://denilag.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/kowunabilegukavog.pdf
    • https://winosimodax.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/74423848447.pdf
    • https://xukitivusapu.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/89925079247.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/bewewolifokolugetu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/13879903487.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/xazijejizamoketabuguta.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/vuxopikuxoxixu.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000dd9b.bin
994ebe9d252835b04151cdd80017b76c9e96873cc555e94834cbb55d7caa5347		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDD9B 5296 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000ef81.bin
841e08581a536cf658526cbf3fa02bf35c9075150a805cc7af11fb355ff26e33		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEF81 10088 bytes

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