Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 740cff4be70fb351…

MALICIOUS

PDF

75.3 KB Created: 2020-08-18 21:43:03 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 4a8ab955516b38befbf11738debee445 SHA-1: 0ed34d16573bcbaf21684d1a1c24e2cdcc6bc711 SHA-256: 740cff4be70fb351dbaa32c3b5300547bc47ccf9f012fe235e66486cb68027b8
214 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains multiple heuristics indicating malicious intent, including a critical finding of a redirector link to ttraff.ru and a link farm of 28 external PDF links. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains text related to 'Caxton associates lp annual report' and a URL that matches the redirector, suggesting a lure. The presence of 'powershell_version.pdf' in the document text hints at potential command execution, possibly via embedded JavaScript, which is common in malicious PDFs.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=caxton+associates+lp+annual+report
    • http://files.lifessweetinc.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969480/muxoj.pdf
    • http://files.blackbayhorsefarm.ca/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381518/dagitomilakomanu.pdf
    • http://wokiwipep.dreamartist.studio/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739704/lenetebimelivodun.pdf
    • http://files.effective-leadership.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131452944/punarexu.pdf
    • http://tubebape.affordablephotos.net/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383744/1205712.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/6422/2101/files/womudagowuromikapekuzuv.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/9682/6261/files/check_powershell_version.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/7437/9158/files/30760112309.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/0233/9232/files/49589704942.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/0196/0854/files/bairavaa_songs_tamilrockers.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/5627/5360/files/dabanojozudofuj.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/8389/0850/files/31195069641.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/8148/2919/files/suposelet.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/6097/6021/files/12101461899.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/043
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d13d.bin
7082ae5f9dd4177cbf42eda1e0243bdf9f1b2bcd9b8c877933314a3cda1c0782		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD13D 4900 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000e1f6.bin
8d3f9601f401e5d18faa7ab1725b6fcd01a605f5ac36a7c503c0b2e01891dc52		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE1F6 14796 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0001101a.bin
ff5f0ef16caf3e97cd1984b3a03ea88e11eab8cf63d2ee006085a4b9995833f3		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1101A 4324 bytes

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