Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 740104c1a6789b23…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

15.5 KB
MD5: c20469cfefcfff15d9a8d7309a0cc99d SHA-1: b099ac273d0623b7cd4a8b7c27a74384f49acfcf SHA-256: 740104c1a6789b2325d444f6ed8819357cd6509be6d84828b907beb1e8f7d6d6
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document containing embedded OLE object data, specifically triggering heuristics related to the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). This indicates the file is designed to exploit this known client-side vulnerability for code execution. No document body text or scripts were extracted, but the critical heuristic firings strongly suggest a malicious intent to exploit this vulnerability.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000514.bin
788fd6485479e21ba2355aa17f3833644b5cebe81231c2c0d058f68c3fb702c1
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x514 1730 bytes