Emotet — Office (OOXML) / .XLSX malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 740015b3b163bf1d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .XLSX

1.16 MB Created: 2015-06-05 18:19:34 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 16.0300 First seen: 2022-04-20
MD5: bf9d0e10f8da1a8d9e9a6c4d3dd5bc7c SHA-1: 550a507cdb78a9a8cd003aaaf1107d70a6f9cbb5 SHA-256: 740015b3b163bf1d31e6ec2ab734a90d4a5a8d6e6d2b65a569c453c6b0477beb
260 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1218.010 System Binary Proxy Execution: Regsvr32

The file contains critical heuristics indicating Excel 4.0 macros that reassemble a payload. The macros use WinAPI strings like 'Kernel32.CreateDirectoryA' to create a directory 'C:\Jhfrg', and then execute 'regsvr32 /s calc' and 'regsvr32 C:\Jhfrg\Rgsrhda.ooccxx' (and similar for .ooccxxb and .ooccxx c). This indicates a downloader pattern, consistent with the Emotet family, which often uses such techniques to fetch and execute further malicious code.

Heuristics 5

  • Excel 4.0 macro sheet (1 sheet(s)) critical OOXML_XLM_MACROSHEET
    Spreadsheet contains an Excel 4.0 (XLM) macro sheet — XLM was a major Office malware vector during 2020-2022 and evaded many VBA-focused controls before Microsoft tightened XLM defaults. Even legitimate XLM use is rare in modern workbooks. The macro sheet is stored as XLSB/BIFF12 binary content, which many XML-only OOXML scanners miss.
  • Binary XLM macro sheet with WinAPI/download strings critical OOXML_XLM_BINARY_WINAPI_STRINGS
    Excel 4.0 macro sheet is stored as BIFF12/XLSB binary data and contains Win32 download or process-execution API strings such as URLDownloadToFileA, ShellExecuteA, or CreateDirectoryA. These strings are high-signal in XLM macro sheets and catch payload-download macros that XML-formula scanners cannot parse.
  • XLM payload reassembled from CHAR()/split formulas critical OOXML_XLM_REASSEMBLED_PAYLOAD
    An Excel 4.0 macro sheet builds its payload inside the formula token stream by concatenating per-character CHAR() calls and string fragments, so no WinAPI name, shell command, or URL is ever contiguous in the .bin for a literal-bytes scan to find. Reassembling the formulas recovered download/execute API names, LOLBin commands (regsvr32/rundll32/mshta/wmic/powershell), or a payload URL — the de-obfuscated download-and-run kill chain.
  • ClamAV: Xls.Downloader.Emotet-OOXML_XL-af43432fbcb8603c-9980048-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Xls.Downloader.Emotet-OOXML_XL-af43432fbcb8603c-9980048-0
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
91be447cf4ed5b5fa18315c6180ef6d62647686972b570319f960439fe37d717		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: xl/embeddings/oleObject3.bin 3099136 bytes
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
a6724425b761391a2288cdb0e402bdc8cf2de9a4e93260c95af92b78344a367e		 ole-package OOXML xl/embeddings/oleObject3.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 3072068 bytes
emf_00.emf
3f0f6bb70f3d65dcc8d248d78ac320bcc22b1148ea5fdd2c1043065d03460133		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: xl/media/image1.emf 6144552 bytes
xlm_sheet_00.bin
6bae0182603c72419c686442423b8e5f58e84c6cef116e9d12d902028c53678f		 xlm-macrosheet OOXML XLM macro sheet: xl/macrosheets/sheet1.bin 2137 bytes

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