Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 73e49663ba0a3ddc…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.1 KB
MD5: 362ff10477583ede83cb6ef32187bb3c SHA-1: ef308b2d6a51147c3f380cf849712a1f0072689f SHA-256: 73e49663ba0a3ddcae4390264cd65a34b98554f575261e8959db7f4e744b7f1a
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability CVE-2017-11882. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution when the document is opened, likely leading to the download and execution of a secondary payload. The presence of ".objupdate" further indicates an attempt to force OLE object activation.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000007a.bin
862d9280d4addcac42213b19ff867a90de73be404a9403b72e33a13db7ba14e5
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x7A 1858 bytes