Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 73df35a284f966b2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

46.8 KB Created: 2020-08-16 11:59:44 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: d5f3bcbac75f79598e077246e9b9bbf2 SHA-1: 63e0e0c3610dfb7ad3ecabd872ac2dbc126e4d7a SHA-256: 73df35a284f966b205737997b33352b7cb283762364bfdcd6713679b040d048e
194 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains numerous embedded links, with one identified as a malicious redirector. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains the same malicious URL. This suggests the primary purpose is to redirect users to malicious sites, potentially for phishing or malware distribution. The presence of a password-protected archive lure heuristic further supports the idea of a multi-stage attack.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=hbse+open+form+apply+date
    • http://rimiz.guelphpropertymanagement.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776445/7ed18411e.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/4024/2840/files/flight_itinerary_template.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/0461/7119/files/fepitenikof.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/7440/3996/files/government_spending_worksheet_p._1.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/6451/5994/files/30440960821.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/negopolikutowuz.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/4686/3005/files/81661519615.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/0776/9750/files/puboraxuz.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/6564/7002/files/majigaxuxuwikegujumuje.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/4272/5275/files/73402365991.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/8226/1415/files/tepivakewewigawenu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0449/8269/8142/files/httpd_xampp_conf.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/3282/8314/files/78390776442.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/5802/7928/files/antibiotic_guidelines_2020_johns_hopkins.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006b1d.bin
ea937920fdd95166c4344789d2a4c88bb36198b3ed14b61c032ce68ba7a1ef7c		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6B1D 5128 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00007c6b.bin
a11d96c8bd33f27c16b15c98612b92f254ac684b0517cc60a0d7daeebe79b029		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7C6B 10492 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000a01c.bin
a542ec26cea93e049a2e27cd59b1347dd9bbdea13775fd7b822b3c2b3136116f		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xA01C 4324 bytes

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