Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 73d77c7e284735d2…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

9.4 KB
MD5: 0859dface3c42fb155a1f56e89ff5a14 SHA-1: c9016d9a56d7eb5742be27040f85fcab68e6e1b5 SHA-256: 73d77c7e284735d26de14169f3f14b0032c1b962d324c91dde99c8f18bd3b6ea
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability via the Equation Editor. This exploit allows for arbitrary code execution, which is typically used to download and execute further malicious content. No specific family could be identified, but the exploit vector is clear.

Heuristics 5

  • Obfuscated Equation Editor ProgID + activation critical CVE related RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID from top-level \objdata hex after nested RTF junk groups are ignored, and the document also contains \objemb plus \objupdate activation. This is an obfuscated Equation Editor exploit surface associated with CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 families, but no exact malformed MTEF CVE primitive was recovered from this object.
  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000110e.bin
db9f21da670ce5625900442eecd6a4fa6766dba84ee71e95519c9bc4d902849c
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x110E 1967 bytes