Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 73cfe3d98c35028a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

46.7 KB Created: 2020-09-18 02:56:17 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: e5fa7d88494945739db849483298c7f6 SHA-1: 184c0db6b68bde6d41f45e7f1409e5b923f68ca0 SHA-256: 73cfe3d98c35028a403ac7f894bf52658022f372f66b476d45170a387848fd2a
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many pointing to disposable domains, indicating a link farm or SEO manipulation tactic. One critical heuristic identified a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure. While no scripts were extracted, the presence of numerous external links suggests the document's primary purpose is to redirect users to potentially malicious sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.me/wix?keyword=serta+perfect+sleeper+presidential+suite+ii+firm+mattress
    • http://viwoj.saltyfincharter.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437421/vekowu.pdf
    • http://files.taitcolberg.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874655/jubopeku-mofebasotowag.pdf
    • http://kefejixud.perkypelican.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606255/8390737.pdf
    • http://zokuv.plumb-bing.co.nz/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969114/8294135.pdf
    • http://files.chelsealevalley.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437859/ba93ba3.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://bf39e31b-db74-4de8-9aee-a6fd690cc669.filesusr.com/ugd/fc3b0b_63a48441dad74bfc8eeaa2a4081a45a2.pdf?index=true
    • https://6f9d3d64-550d-48bb-82d2-3efedbd37237.filesusr.com/ugd/5ecadc_d9da5afb8ce446e0b02792e3c02ba757.pdf?index=true
    • https://8f63b421-af80-40aa-b699-bd49e9f56a03.filesusr.com/ugd/cf79db_1c397fe7d5234e98a500fcb988d9343c.pdf?index=true
    • https://1292e161-31a8-4c1c-ab5e-5c46085205a9.filesusr.com/ugd/850f07_f3b3fa8706c1468bb1eaca8f1b836503.pdf?index=true
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/1456/9631/files/99386701478.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/3110/8503/files/27555105691.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/7004/4825/files/ableitungsregeln_mit_beispielen.pdf
    • https://d8ef33bf-0470-4095-9770-ec5cef105963.filesusr.com/ugd/e948c1_542b5232fe6746879d1597714698a7ca.pdf?index=true
    • https://e41a00a4-9172-40b8-a47a-e0845f36f940.filesusr.com/ugd/dbbfd0_3107746bfbd343799788636d183a91cc.pdf?index=true
    • https://94b3b21d-14ee-4d2b-a80f-d993f6e6c342.filesusr.com/ugd/8bf3fc_30acbcf13065495898cd4174eed0d719.pdf?index=true
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007736.bin
7c30d07c89edbef9fe1b248b21721fb831b461b5341f83a5571093c71bc62c92
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7736 5404 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000897f.bin
a4e0e238398e601aeb499df3243ca9202fa5551e87da8bfd78547ba67a7fd308
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x897F 10432 bytes