Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 739f13025ab4a9b2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

76.4 KB Created: 2020-12-30 14:20:18 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-07
MD5: 14aea0170846af4725c94119fdd8e156 SHA-1: 237b152404b93190a244675328980a57071297cb SHA-256: 739f13025ab4a9b29b83617264c2cca26edaf87831e466fdbfbfbfeea10b70d7
186 Risk Score
Tags
free-cdn-ebook-manual-lure

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, indicating a link farm or phishing attempt. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded URLs are indicative of malicious activity, likely aiming to redirect users to potentially harmful sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://trafffe.ru/123?utm_term=glock+27+holster+concealed PDF link annotation
    • https://bewodopogogubak.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134886142/761062.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fijojonibiw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681787/7922058.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jufavufopu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134340263/zadilowavasutasaxon.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nurafotupitu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134495453/boladu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://juluvolalo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134435755/cb2f499.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4477864/normal_5fa8c319e07ec.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vizomitula.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134266598/2d1e8591d9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sefositudixe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134524400/5009607.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dijaxoki.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134666341/bimezipewubiwoj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xataramev.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134320843/tapalisizemef.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://givudaxoj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134490896/wilanetapuzi-zelemosij-jizavodivaluv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/sojaxub/wudezedufonefosakolope.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000dcd0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDCD0 5072 bytes
SHA-256: b64754984174a07f88a456e15afc62146dadcba0a50556a4a9f92aaafff1bfce
font_01_sfnt_off0000ee05.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEE05 12752 bytes
SHA-256: 981bdb3bfef6390edad63ffc55bcacfc4693d386170544d3476fdede04b0b838
font_02_sfnt_off00011709.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11709 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 9f355172d696dda274cac500966718f112ce76951f19577ac4888987ea6471b2

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