Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7397dce79ca347ae…

MALICIOUS

PDF

68.7 KB Created: 2021-06-07 17:54:50 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 8a9d92b887e68c9c88f83c2a48c7c049 SHA-1: d8891fcde5f5e082f8aa90d345b51c4cd045c910 SHA-256: 7397dce79ca347ae2725a5164e378b03e20911f65e9f15e9c45ee4bea0dc6369
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF document contains numerous links pointing to compromised WordPress sites, suggesting a phishing or malware distribution scheme. The ML classifier strongly indicates maliciousness, and the presence of embedded URLs and link farm heuristics confirm the intent to redirect users to potentially harmful content. No scripts were extracted, but the overall structure and URL patterns are indicative of a phishing lure.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://huntic.ru/uplcv?utm_term=ldm+implementation+m%2526e+plan+template+sample
    • http://www.sempresaude.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606cc1f9af434---wejavafurarug.pdf
    • http://automsystem.com/UploadFile/file/20210516235827443.pdf
    • http://ajivikafinance.com/userfiles/file/punowo.pdf
    • https://www.karavanlakesfet.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f81bb77f711b5b4b1d54352476222055/33564288030.pdf
    • https://aryaayur.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609bec71d61f3---soraf.pdf
    • http://webinaris.org/ckfinder/userfiles/publics/files/tetapunewotekoxapejujuga.pdf
    • https://cal.lighting/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/4369c96b51343f5e714fd966bf5d6651/gejukosajobub.pdf
    • https://africanresearchcenter.com/userfiles/file/427387919.pdf
    • http://ashioke.com/images/library/File/fapavuvadisegijatefu.pdf
    • https://rjiminfra.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b363da7efc7b91f0b828f76471dc7fe9/80870504324.pdf
    • https://www.pferde-fuer-unsere-kinder.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606ef4603420e---85089089190.pdf
    • https://elpmarketing.ca/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/18af8adfa0133ee18c8b7296fa4678b8/30479540770.pdf
    • https://inclinedigital.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607d93a1481a6---65214789843.pdf
    • http://oticonshop.net/ckfinder/userfiles/files/92023084951.pdf
    • http://blackshirts1962.com/clients/f/f2/f245580d3072b78cda2271cf7a7e3f61/File/larajewije.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d235.bin
715d64739aef410b985e54a2ea78ca5e8371c6b6287cf193753ddcadfd49e41c		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD235 4772 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000e260.bin
a53602b12d20a9eb848991a705edd274af0a7f401995e16716cfec65ca04f10e		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE260 10580 bytes

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