Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7386e94f91ca706a…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.3 KB
MD5: f13888a126fe67386b5529c399c894a5 SHA-1: 539b85f936e095d2ceeb5efa4838dbce51597659 SHA-256: 7386e94f91ca706a983236b72fb5acb8222f631f86dd6170624ecf8799596cd9
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. This indicates an attempt to exploit a client execution vulnerability, likely delivered as a spearphishing attachment. No further IOCs were extracted from the file.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000a5.bin
0c2544456fc11bc45f1b0e803c3b836663eaea4cda6d2caa34e1517e2c948745
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA5 1930 bytes