Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 734f41db947e74e1…

MALICIOUS

PDF

80.4 KB Created: 2021-09-13 16:30:43 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-11-21
MD5: 9f61fcf97643239be51796a55205b2d9 SHA-1: 2295ded0fa6fc5e6acad8a2a1fa078a0d6209e42 SHA-256: 734f41db947e74e18f16f54d450440eac39282c46f2a0e8e6ccc63f4fcb0c7bd
224 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF document contains embedded JavaScript and multiple external links, some pointing to IP addresses and compromised CMS uploads, indicating a malicious intent to host or redirect to malicious content. The 'Remote-support tool lure' heuristic strongly suggests the document's purpose is to trick the user into installing or running remote access software, which is a common tactic for gaining unauthorized system access. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection further corroborate the malicious nature of the file.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9949

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Remote-support tool lure high SE_REMOTE_SUPPORT_LURE
    Document instructs the user to install, open, or connect with a remote-support tool such as AnyDesk, TeamViewer, Quick Assist, or ScreenConnect — high-risk in an unsolicited document
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://aviapartner.biz/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/judosilaroninonisu.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://sushrutproctology.org/ckfinder/userfiles/files/51323720822.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dsodrecital.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613bd4e89896a---vogumesujap.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dmn.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1612fb7d31e494---36610362667.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://isisthailand.org/file_media/file_image/file/5146812052.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jingyilin.org/uploads/file/42947448975.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dichvumayphoto.vn/webroot/img/files/daxowomufovopidanabu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mtegl.wsystem.sk/userfiles/files/widawu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://haiannweb.com/uploads/files/xikemelotisotej.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://flcevent.fcu.edu.tw/plugin/ce1/ckfinder/userfiles/files/20210907094837.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://140.121.180.103/ckfinder/userfiles/files/94704616003.pdfPDF link annotation
    • https://bodymart.in/ckfinder/userfiles/files/wopiwofakojawogatemoxo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://resttour.com/images/userfiles/files/16850876255.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.bankkartya.hu/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/66979577018.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://prime42.ru/userfiles/files/vigidexisedinovorenubetu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://theopenhouseclub.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3fc01fd786ca455aa19c2249b2a41bef/77776314176.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://miamiwars.pl/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/70d6a2ea7ceb2f4734527cb13edfea64/wamulozojowusosuxe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://heathrowairporttaxi.website/userfiles/file/56503078230.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ciiinnovationsummit.com/ci/userfiles/files/57761461339.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://df-2.de/images/daten/file/gemisita.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://megalightgroup.lv/uploads/files/99273446481.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.vnos.vn/app/webroot/uploads/files/78712323807.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fazekaskozpont.hu/images/upload/file/21827159156.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ledseoul.com/userData/board/file/98223945313.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://indiantiffin4me.com/nbloom/fckuploads/file/pamozejazi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/GLLx1DTH0VQ/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+access+root+in+androidPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d4fa.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD4FA 10396 bytes
SHA-256: fde9198f8b9256a4fa0062005e094bb03a3431a926e33264f9464f17c20096b4
font_01_sfnt_off0000eca6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xECA6 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off000104b8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x104B8 18428 bytes
SHA-256: a4a2e23622f2b5de7bf31bce07b584594dcd9fbbeb3fc29e4ef3b490212f3821