RTF malware analysis — malicious · 732795ba814eaffe

MALICIOUS

RTF

73.3 KB First seen: 2024-08-01

MD5: 0ab62c1916d23d8cb531e308441dc2fc SHA-1: b852938da652323c744634cd2b644a6b87dc7b7d SHA-256: 732795ba814eaffece7b7956416329fed3edce7026317189225812437a3043a0

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: Malicious Code

The RTF document contains multiple indicators of exploitation targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objdata, \objupdate, and a split Equation Editor ProgID strongly suggests that the document is designed to embed and activate an OLE object. This object is likely a second-stage payload, which is a common technique for delivering malware.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000f40.bin` `f7b6a800803571c6c64f9d6dfc5c1be483a466938263c4e0fd36d02fa93c01ea`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xF40	1535 bytes

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