Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7322921e28c9c513…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

194.4 KB Created: 2021-10-26 14:54:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: e1bbf5f7fafdd35d1e758fdc77c1ab73 SHA-1: 97b4d1b39ff752ba7139900176d8cef5c83ba893 SHA-256: 7322921e28c9c513936609869b0f2e2bef04c52f44ab6e1e1fa20c219d0bb2e0
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample contains an embedded OLE object which is flagged as a risky file type that drops an auto-executable payload, specifically identified as a JAR file. This indicates the document is designed to execute a secondary payload upon opening. The presence of this embedded object strongly suggests an attempt at initial compromise via a malicious attachment.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
3ba87bf90a78a2a1449f98158e7befee9997e9bdc127299c10ccc058d7450db6		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 173056 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.97, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
83bd52cff72cbed6a2de9e518ade5bc88bb6fa12c28e4c01a7770d5d8979686a		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 168912 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
5cd692f5bb228b4047de9be007f5456eb737afe1f414087ad71fe3bdd9663f1d		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5140 bytes

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