Emotet — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 72e7964c7102bfa9…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

231.3 KB Created: 2020-08-14 23:47:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 1f45ba8f1d0883e5c22a331044af9033 SHA-1: b26d3a7cfbd8d3f7258584bc495219b3d241300e SHA-256: 72e7964c7102bfa9af7a0be32f58dbb6260617a4bf71022680d267e1e40a45c0
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample contains VBA macros, including a Document_Open auto-execution macro and a UserForm hidden-property command stager, which are indicative of Emotet malware. The ClamAV detection explicitly names Emotet. The VBA script appears to be obfuscated but its structure suggests it is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 7

  • VBA UserForm hidden-property command stager critical OLE_VBA_USERFORM_HIDDEN_COMMAND_STAGER
    VBA auto-exec macro creates a COM object from a decoded variable and reconstructs command text through Split/Join and hidden UserForm properties such as ControlTipText, Tag, Pages, or HelpContextId. This is a high-confidence macro downloader/loader shape seen in the reviewed OLE set, but it is not an Office CVE exploit primitive.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-9349720-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-9349720-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
c9e222625209724b824cd241f8d136260a3fd5171cd978940b3d275289318aae
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 8071 bytes