Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 72b955328a89837a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

37.0 KB Created: 2020-06-11 20:22:56 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 6440561655f711cdecfe9d53447c01fe SHA-1: e391f57b585ea03882ca8f4a4e618d9f5885d9b2 SHA-256: 72b955328a89837a78eb257dda79273930f74c95c3bc76094c4af1c826b361ad
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF document contains a heuristic firing for a large number of external PDF links, suggesting a link farm or a distribution point for malicious content. The ML classifier also flagged this PDF with high confidence. While no scripts were extracted, the embedded URLs are the primary indicators of compromise, pointing to a likely SEO spam or content distribution campaign.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://mta-sts.momandpopsonline.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871871/131871871.html#adobe+pdf+ebook+on+kindle
    • http://lamanchatattooz.com/uploads/1/3/0/4/130436234/kivoniguvor.pdf
    • http://annasciaobellasalon.com/uploads/1/3/0/3/130379291/xududisisenil.pdf
    • http://hostmaster.freeworldband.uk/uploads/1/3/0/4/130435577/vejubono-xiniguxul.pdf
    • http://nfgcycles.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380320/nonurogenaxilaf-forexutunogem-sefogazobexulil-zifibegixomu.pdf
    • http://xspyra.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438478/goganujedelepi-setituledowop-kefidiwufafi-kurujaked.pdf
    • http://anonymous-copy.com/uploads/1/3/0/2/130271016/levetatina.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://dazorabe.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/72072519197.pdf
    • https://kovevaso.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/doker.pdf
    • https://nakilopediv.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/godogelozagipugivamevu.pdf
    • https://vavadalebuvi.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/kapabigiporososajodapu.pdf
    • https://zunaluvut.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/piluwafemajubomivose.pdf
    • https://dadisegikew.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/93076620347.pdf
    • https://numejed.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/tatenoxixugega.pdf
    • https://borafitafule.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/44602749007.pdf
    • http://blogs.adobe.com/digitalpublishing/supported-devices
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006311.bin
25310dae2610cc18f1bfbd492bbc36c62d3c87c58900dcb14ce48d7088b3b086		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6311 11432 bytes

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