Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 725f1ec71afa4b22…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

245.1 KB
MD5: 66ad268dab5224666c5416bc6924c32d SHA-1: 81fb3f3babeb823c96aa20524a9606e445705c4e SHA-256: 725f1ec71afa4b22495220152a20b366d71ab08219896c87a7682d72815f20b7
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document containing embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering heuristics related to Equation Editor exploitation and OLE object activation. This indicates a likely attempt to exploit a client-side vulnerability for code execution. The presence of OLE object data and the specific Equation Editor CLSID strongly suggest this attack vector. The lack of document body text or scripts means the exact payload cannot be determined, but the exploitation method is clear.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native stream in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM
    RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an Ole10Native stream. This is a strong payload-container signal and is related to Word/OLE exploit delivery, but it is not specific enough on its own to assign a CVE.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000004c0.bin
c4b327971e0c94cb8d47447288c56eae25b86d01d5c5c7c43887f13fe01c84e6
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4C0 4677 bytes