Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 724aa3d331862f0a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

41.9 KB Created: 2020-07-09 03:18:27 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 5418217bfe75cef46d9326efd1e16b2a SHA-1: cda1852d16811f6c08dcba82c70ba78d42e63a22 SHA-256: 724aa3d331862f0a1eaca64b052ded06c62b8871d120c8de424118555df69750
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous links to external PDF files hosted on disposable domains, indicating a link farm or SEO manipulation tactic. One embedded URL, https://ttraff.cc/wb?keyword=entalpia%20de%20formacion%20tabla%20pdf, is flagged as a malicious redirector. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/wb?keyword=entalpia%20de%20formacion%20tabla%20pdf
    • http://files.leejeehee.net/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438234/toxejimerolabamake.pdf
    • http://files.thermage.sg/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398367/2c0290a439d.pdf
    • http://files.azkillerbeessoftball.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874518/jemizip.pdf
    • http://files.rangecustomhomes.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381612/6606813.pdf
    • http://files.sandraturay.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131636954/rutod-zelufir-wovatiso.pdf
    • http://files.amystephenmusic.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775186/c2371f7e1e.pdf
    • http://files.tuskegeebuildersacademy.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740232/soremizomefo-vumin-xokixoneku-pasib.pdf
    • http://files.arlingtonmsband.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606087/ddee7.pdf
    • http://files.nlbcc.net/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814907/8400ce.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://kozaxijewob.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/sarasapelimozilu.pdf
    • https://lirajobavan.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/21150768263.pdf
    • https://gogedopopo213794333.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/funebanimajetuwibav.pdf
    • https://zemenabizide.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/20034557750.pdf
    • https://jupurugasu.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/63773385102.pdf
    • https://xujonajodezo.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/57859124879.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/24375498268.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/6219719719.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/gabagijujusudizal.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/vunumegosuvuvorewufo.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006369.bin
1c3049f5e5a4ccd6514d7a29526d67172c392d85fb9f5ccdf5fd8ba61304e0b7		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6369 5008 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00007450.bin
898df3e2d5d56a0effefc6e9a1aa2472fafbc1fffcb84ac8ff3cd88933b3e208		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7450 11096 bytes

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