Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 722e09a84c440967…

MALICIOUS

PDF

39.7 KB Created: 2020-08-21 18:18:57 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2026-05-08
MD5: 2c3775295c2ca4399eaa79cdf55ac33f SHA-1: b0e49e6fbe2cd4f0cf33a83ffa1101eb6ed04c7e SHA-256: 722e09a84c4409676cad8a63d13e99971a3f08a22532c28f5935b3dd588edcc8
194 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains embedded links that lead to a malicious redirector, disguised as a guide to set up iCloud email on Android. The redirector is designed to lead users to a link farm of other PDFs, likely for phishing or malware distribution. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness, and the presence of multiple PDF links points to a link farm strategy.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=set+up+icloud+email+address+on+android In PDF document text
    • http://files.thesoundingboardministry.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132814097/b97a0ad.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/1035/1513/files/sefuwivad.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/6213/1869/files/zafuxeteromufur.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0453/1814/4155/files/gufujejoxuvozanepez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/pepefawabibuf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/3034/7938/files/jibaxosotexasu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/5506/2938/files/sunojupilelirajada.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/2833/3219/files/1484823142.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/4284/8418/files/2052941613.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/5817/5906/files/maps_in_c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/8475/0747/files/xejururojemenevuvesu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/6354/9845/files/57607793689.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/8266/8437/files/7333678471.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text
🗂 Part of campaign: swgrcplanning.org 4 samples

Related samples 4

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005ce9.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5CE9 5324 bytes
SHA-256: fbe7d566b7a1afef177c07874f42e7a9e11569b88dde49cfa4202c1b6ba76547
font_01_sfnt_off00006ee0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6EE0 10260 bytes
SHA-256: 700f0493285e29c831baa50ab56584b69d098e673c865d5d40dab50d4fbcbe93

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