Office (OOXML) / .DOC static analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7215e503b77bdd7f…

SUSPICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

65.9 KB Created: 2021-05-17 07:54:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: e0452e225acb088de11d6517db7479ac SHA-1: 298ea7b0e1035975e024876665aa13f2a15ea8f7 SHA-256: 7215e503b77bdd7fd48b5f63cbce288bf0caa00ed5688bc9b810cb51ed3a765a
40 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains VBA macros, including a Document_Open auto-execution macro, which is a common technique for initial execution. The script uses GetObject to navigate to a URL constructed from document properties, likely to download and execute a secondary payload. The specific URL and target are obfuscated but the intent is clear.

Heuristics 6

  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/
  • Macro capabilities present but unconfirmed info MACRO_CAPABILITY_UNCORROBORATED
    The document's VBA exposes execution capabilities (Shell/WScript/CreateObject/auto-exec) but nothing corroborates malicious intent — no obfuscation, memory-exec primitive, download+exec chain, encoded payload, LOLBin, DDE, AV hit, or suspicious URL. The verdict was capped at 'suspicious' so legitimate macro-heavy business documents are not flagged malicious on capability presence alone.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
b632aaa45d2704b2fa096fd24cd773451b742acc13431d2c8c551500fae438a5		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1076 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
50484d89371dce5a193c56a1d63eb109e63381e291cfdd11e607dfd0ec19c183		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 17408 bytes

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