Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 721222dc7852e5af…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

165.4 KB Created: 2021-01-05 10:15:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 88264247ae3e60678c62acbf731c9436 SHA-1: e6589a57a5a94ad7e4489b910416a62040a8fb45 SHA-256: 721222dc7852e5af687731f1940aad03767e0b070c84b2ae0fb9a1731d11f4f6
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains a heavily obfuscated VBA macro within its Document_Open subroutine. This macro utilizes CreateObject to instantiate a FileSystemObject, which is then used to create two executable files on the filesystem: 'OMySJHB:\AyVGlHzV\jPNIAFF.VJueCC' and 'YJYLAnEDp:\qjyoGCI\dkSAD.MSPmBF'. The obfuscation and the creation of executable files strongly suggest a downloader or droppper functionality.

Heuristics 7

  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02224-9938637-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02224-9938637-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
8c4d881ce710c5bdc93f3892d458c04d696e3b291027b95b98b9ccba700a5f56
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 10716 bytes