RTF malware analysis — malicious · 71e0b0884fbf2ba2

MALICIOUS

RTF

88.2 KB First seen: 2024-10-05

MD5: 85bb9c92d8128e3c8cf070a813b9ba82 SHA-1: cc187bf0c745ccd7fb932faa2ee030bb404ab1eb SHA-256: 71e0b0884fbf2ba2f8c52e90ae66f5be792d6b1f67d4ef86226958cc0bba3970

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 Malicious Link T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate indicates that the OLE object is designed to be activated automatically, likely leading to the execution of a secondary payload. The heuristics strongly suggest exploitation of the Equation Editor, a common vector for initial compromise.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001785.bin` `842b60bfd3f07df78fa36478ca670e5d4c79b514be4defc585b36685b70c5117`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1785	1750 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.