Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 71d88df0dc314e3e…

MALICIOUS

RTF

4.0 KB
MD5: 65e1e4df4008ec6617c97b0a33658036 SHA-1: 6834b1fdb073c89d734d0978f80e724cac8b6936 SHA-256: 71d88df0dc314e3e3c8d7275a9e5c7d98a5df1bd5609fbf8c186312d75bf312b
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers heuristics related to the Equation Editor vulnerability. This indicates the file is designed to exploit a known vulnerability for client-side execution, likely delivered as a spearphishing attachment. The embedded OLE object data is the primary mechanism for this exploit.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000b8.bin
26a86adb15ea9e6286d474419656cafbb5ead0ac91411b3a9c954e1af5bf65d3		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB8 1704 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.