Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 71c0e91c6c3fe936…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOCX

167.9 KB Created: 2021-01-05 17:50:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 3cb2dcdcf57274fe33aa05c69c18f849 SHA-1: d8754dd37c7098c0b90364d8b53ac67c12db6ac0 SHA-256: 71c0e91c6c3fe936f070d727b1881971d387e0989cb112e40619e0675dd46a45
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample contains a malicious VBA macro that executes upon opening the document. The macro is obfuscated and uses CreateObject to interact with the file system, creating files with suspicious names and paths like 'ullgtlIxh:\oVXxqGIDB\sBFJHmWJ.ByrvyNXI' and 'LVZutLGhJ:\aOIhnRAF\CbWlODM.ssogG'. This indicates the macro's purpose is to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 7

  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02224-9938637-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02224-9938637-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
4ad47f06387c2fe26b40af7c5c3febabd490580f16728c81acf291150b2fb0bb
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 10757 bytes