RTF malware analysis — malicious · 71b64945fc557532

MALICIOUS

RTF

41.7 KB First seen: 2023-05-18

MD5: 5a6ffc4ce7064b544f7f129ce9462785 SHA-1: 977ec377f9a5446e68f43bc3896aa9d8fe1e0a1f SHA-256: 71b64945fc5575322ea0d9b4462a90a125673ce143adf3d2d290edfce4c31b17

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object and specifically targets the Equation Editor, a known vulnerability vector. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic indicates the document prompts the user to enable editing, which is a common tactic for malware droppers to bypass security measures and trigger the exploit. The embedded OLE object data is the primary indicator of malicious intent.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00005bb9.bin` `cc755f2d0bc37072809afca58605b02428a5203d7e4485ca8122c51d8976c5f7`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x5BB9	1780 bytes

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