Office (OOXML) / .DOC static analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 71adba3a8692ba36…

SUSPICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

63.2 KB Created: 2021-05-11 13:17:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: e6fa4e620f40158675e05a337318ee50 SHA-1: 5b6dfc5bcdd0d9fd0b6ed397c1d325f41784a0d6 SHA-256: 71adba3a8692ba36d24a2280954bc55db0b0c2a067a84a569682414443893ac7
40 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample is a Word document containing a VBA macro that automatically executes upon opening via the Document_Open subroutine. The macro utilizes WScript.Shell and CreateObject to download and execute a second-stage payload, indicated by the critical OLE_VBA_SHELL and OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT heuristic firings. The obfuscated document body content also suggests script execution.

Heuristics 8

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/
  • Macro capabilities present but unconfirmed info MACRO_CAPABILITY_UNCORROBORATED
    The document's VBA exposes execution capabilities (Shell/WScript/CreateObject/auto-exec) but nothing corroborates malicious intent — no obfuscation, memory-exec primitive, download+exec chain, encoded payload, LOLBin, DDE, AV hit, or suspicious URL. The verdict was capped at 'suspicious' so legitimate macro-heavy business documents are not flagged malicious on capability presence alone.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
ca031fe1e73ae24ee3042b5a217f16d40ccbe12e1ad46faeb764aa8b9009af67		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 2485 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
cfa2c902caa9963f47a07b689ad589f861e81ba17dede1e15021aafbb9a6ffa6		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 17408 bytes

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