Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 71ab378df1ca7ad6…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

64.2 KB
MD5: be0ba04bb2626ec80de30aec9ac57b25 SHA-1: d7c1d32e8ae5b404b8338abf54c141cd9e6dbc33 SHA-256: 71ab378df1ca7ad64f7fb4754d82d33df4d066af5e83a60ffd431726d51f1e3f
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The file is an RTF document containing embedded OLE objects and specifically targets the Equation Editor component. Heuristics indicate exploitation of the Equation Editor via OLE object activation, a known method for executing arbitrary code. This strongly suggests the document is designed to exploit a vulnerability, likely CVE-2017-11882, to achieve code execution for downloading and running a malicious payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000ea2.bin
36c74e483cec77ddaffae14ff28659e393038550fe54833dd66fdf748e1f57be
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xEA2 1636 bytes