Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 716d1c4fefb75703…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.35 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-08-23
MD5: a59b3b75e5d9ee8dd660ec03da98e16c SHA-1: 04bbb8a08070db39fbbb1ed305e737633f462d5b SHA-256: 716d1c4fefb757034e654594323c441f0ff2b92a08e321b01f34e4c2755956a9
272 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.001 Malicious Link: Malicious Link T1566 Phishing T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Exploitation for Code Execution: Visual Basic

The sample contains an embedded Equation Editor OLE object that exploits CVE-2017-11882. This object is designed to deliver a secondary PDF payload, which in turn contains a direct link to a suspicious URL. The VBA macros are present but contain no executable statements, indicating they are not the primary execution vector.

Heuristics 8

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
fe377d4fbdd4277a8c14132cc6ba3e587dc844feea3b611dcdfd7dd146e7d2a7		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD0010061D/OLe10natIVe 2020 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0005f200.pdf
fbc9406e45e289f94675e64d725b861ce0fb2e354a14d1244b960ac63b2e6d6b		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x5F200 1029120 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001000.pdf
4206d5357f43a164d39beffdddc7e96f024571b18f90879172235b9f4d9381e3		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1000 1414656 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006400.pdf
ca26c8d47bf915b971d340ed4289a61671a7254f887b5ac469b7485cebcc733b		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6400 1393152 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00019000.pdf
874f07cf1665e1c30c6710a5a63c7d601043fe4afaecd9ecebe3dabb31f405ca		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x19000 1316352 bytes

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